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A.  BACKGROUND   
Throughout history, nations and their militaries have faced the logistical 
challenges of moving personnel, materiel, and supplies to and from the battlefield. 
Friction can occur in supply chains and support networks during the rapid movement of 
offensive operations, across stretched defensive lines, or even in the retrograde of combat 
forces after a perceivable victory.  The United States is currently confronted with similar 
challenges in returning personnel and equipment from Afghanistan as security 
responsibilities transition to the local populace and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
comes to a close. 
The eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan is not the first time that the U.S. has 
conducted a large-scale retrograde abroad, and, most likely, it will not be the last.  Within 
the previous century, the Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. military services 
actually have a significant record of retrogrades and lessons learned from the challenges 
in each event.  Notable and concrete examples were retrogrades following World Wars I 
and II, Vietnam, Operation Desert Storm, and, most recently, Operation Iraqi Freedom.  
Nevertheless, no prior operation potentially compares to the logistical challenges that 
decision-makers face in considering how to effectively and efficiently retrograde from 
Afghanistan, a country landlocked 1,000 miles from the nearest seaport. 
Many retrograde variables and factors come into play and are of concern, the 
foremost being the safe transition of personnel leaving Afghanistan, but other concerns 
include available lines of communication, transportation capacity, geopolitical 
arrangements, concurrent combat operations, and cost.  Another consideration is the 
eventual disposition of all equipment, including obsolete, degraded, and surplus items.  
During conflicts, the DoD typically procures large amounts of supplementary equipment 
to sustain continuous operations and to address specific enemy threats.  An example is 
the rapid procurement of the mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles to 
counter the devastating effects of enemy improvised explosive devices (IEDs).  
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Equipment or items in excess potentially could strain supply chains and maintainers, so 
analyzing and forecasting approved acquisition objectives (AAOs) is an important factor 
during the retrograde process.  The U.S. military is additionally susceptible to the 
nation’s contemporary fiscal issues and likely budget reductions, leading to sizably 
smaller forces to manage current operations and support future requirements.  These 
undetermined factors are mentioned because even they could have far-reaching impacts 
and could influence the outcomes in an Afghanistan retrograde. 
A particular problem of concern for the Marine Corps and the broader DoD is 
grasping all of the retrograde variables, logically summarizing them, and determining a 
reasonable and credible cost to the entire process.  Currently, the analysis of retrograde 
lacks cohesion and clarity on the question of costs.  We plan to help resolve this problem 
by proposing a new cost model, the fully burdened cost of retrograde, redeployment, 
reconstitution, and reset and analysis of alternatives (FBCR4 & AoA), as a way to help 
commanders more accurately gauge all associated costs with R4 and therefore make more 
informed decisions for the particular case of Afghanistan.  Comparable to DoD 
Instruction 5000.2 (OUSD[AT&L], 2008) requiring the fully burdened cost of delivered 
energy to be analyzed, our model applies the same concept to the retrograde of equipment 
(p. 59).  Most important to the Marine Corps is that the FBCR4 & AoA concept and 
model could be valuable in supporting and executing the Commandant’s Operation 
Enduring Freedom Ground Equipment Reset Strategy (United States Marine Corps 
[USMC], 2012).  Additionally, due to its combination of strategic scope, simple design, 
and itemization of common processes in each step, our FBCR4 & AoA concept (Figure 
1) and model could be adopted institutionally to assist policy-makers’ decisions in any 
future military operation. 
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Figure 1.  The FBCR4 & AoA Conceptual View 
The FBCR4 & AoA concept and model estimates and summarizes all average 
labor and materiel costs associated with a particular defense article retrograded through 
these processes: 
1. outside continental U.S. (OCONUS) item preparation at the point of origin 
in theater; 
2. OCONUS transportation through 1 + … + n modes of transport; 
3. continental U.S. (CONUS) transportation through 1 + … + n modes of 
transport; 
4. CONUS depot-level reset and repair; 
5. excess defense article (EDA) transfer option minus revenues; and 
6. scrapping option minus revenues. 
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Defense articles or pieces of equipment being shipped and transported are grouped in one 
of two broad categories: vehicular (also called break-bulk) or container compatible.  
Combat vehicles leaving the theater can require significant coordination and extra means 
of transport, like flatbed haulers, rail cars, or more cubic space on aircraft, all for one 
item.  It is most likely that combat vehicle quantities will comprise the majority of weight 
leaving Afghanistan, and we only analyze combat vehicle types for the purposes of this 
thesis due to data availability and for the sake of simplicity. 
Additionally, we identified a few trends in the historical analysis of retrogrades 
and then incorporated them into the model.  In every drawdown that we researched, there 
were three options exercised to retrograde equipment: (1) transport out of theater, 
(2) transfer to foreign allies as EDA, or (3) scrap to an inoperative level.  Usually, a 
combination of all three activities was exercised to some degree, with transportation 
being the most utilized.  These activities are our model’s base options and decisions at the 
point of origin.  Our other observation is that there are only three methods of 
transportation: (1) air, (2) land, or (3) sea.  This may seem mundane, but it is essential in 
the model to calculate all legs of transportation and associated costs in order to 
understand the total estimation.   
B.   OBJECTIVE 
The primary objective of this thesis is to aggregate the numerous variables, fees, 
and constraints of R4 for any combat theater in order to contemporaneously assist in 
executing the Commandant’s OEF Ground Equipment Reset Strategy (USMC, 2012) and 
informing key leadership of critical R4 cost analysis.  This objective is accomplished 
through illustrating historical trends from past conflicts and evaluating a broad range of 
data.   
The second objective of this thesis is to equip DoD and Marine Corps planners 
with the framework for a permanent planning tool not only for today’s complex logistical 
issues, but also for solving retrograde dilemmas in future conflicts. 
 5 
C.   SCOPE  
The scope of the FBCR4 & AoA model allowed us to estimate a funding range 
requirement to retrograde all Marine Corps M-ATV from Afghanistan to CONUS as a 
base case scenario, and it provided the alternative costs associated with EDA transfers 
and scrapping for M-ATVs.  Although we analyzed one vehicle, we developed our model 
for the general utilization of calculating costs for any combat vehicle in any retrograde.    
D.   METHODOLOGY 
The methodology we used in researching this thesis is depicted in Figure 2 and 
described as follows: 
1. Conduct a background review of all major organizations and stakeholders 
that have processes and input relevant to the retrograde of equipment and 
materiel. 
2. Conduct a background/literature review of past retrogrades in order to 
understand past processes and identify major lessons learned. 
3. Define each R4 cost element, purpose, and method. 
4. Construct a model that analyzes and fully calculates the three retrograde 
options of transportation, EDA transfers, and scrapping costs of an item. 
5. Collect data from major organizations and stakeholders. 
6. Develop a base case with one military vehicular item. 
7. Analyze the data between the three retrograde options. 
8. Conduct sensitivity analysis on the results. 
9. Summarize the conclusions and offer recommendations for current and 





















Define R4 Cost 
Burden Elements 
Construct FBCR4 & 
AoA Model Collect Data Develop Base Case 
Data Analysis Sensitivity Analysis Conclusions and Recommendations 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A.   PRELUDE TO LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to give background information regarding four key 
organizations central to our thesis and then follow up with a discussion of historical 
retrograde examples of U.S. equipment from a variety of countries.  Due to the robust and 
complex nature of DoD logistical support, which we discuss first, it is important to have a 
firm understanding of each mission set and the factors that affect the FBCR4 & AoA 
model.  The two cost paths in our conceptual model deal directly with the organizations 
mentioned in this chapter.  
After we conclude laying out the stakeholder background, we then present 
historical lessons of retrograde and redeployment (R2) decisions critical to understand the 
precepts of the FBCR4 & AoA model and thesis.  We discuss the following five 
conflicts/operations: (1) Operations in France; (2) Vietnam War; (3) Operations in 
Thailand; (4) Operation Desert Storm; and (5) Operation Iraqi Freedom.  We then 
conclude the chapter by discussing current initiatives, challenges, and logistical 
complexities surrounding the conundrum that military leaders face when deciding 
whether or not it is beneficial to send all equipment from Afghanistan back to the United 
States. 
B. DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY 
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is a large component of the DoD with the 
primary mission of being a “logistics combat support agency” for the nation’s military 
Services in “peacetime and wartime” (DLA, 2012c).  The DLA headquarters is located at 
Fort Belvoir, VA, and the agency has a workforce of over 26,000 employees (DLA, 
2012c).  The services provided by the DLA are broad in scope and range from stockpiling 
strategic war materiel to reusing precious metals and disposition services (or scrapping).  
The scrapping activity is a topic of focus in this research. 
Within the DLA is Disposition Services, which was formerly the Defense 
Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS) and is still commonly referred to as the 
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Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO).  DRMO provides and executes the 
overall policy for demilitarizing, handling, and disposing of excess military equipment 
and supplies.  Almost every military base has a disposition function, most often for 
recycling ammunition casings, dunnage, and range refuse expended during military 
training.  Currently, three DLA Disposition Services offices (or DRMO sites) exist in 
Afghanistan to support ongoing operations. They are located at Bagram, Kandahar, and 
Camp Leatherneck (DLA, 2012a).  There are also other OCONUS Disposition Services 
offices located at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (DLA, 
2012a).  All of these sites and a few others in neighboring countries compose the DLA’s 
Disposal Region–Central, which primarily supports the Middle East and Persian Gulf 
region, the past Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) drawdown, and OEF (DLA, 2012a).   
1. Brief History 
Providing policy oversight and supply support to hundreds of thousands of troops 
is not an easy task, and it requires a consolidated effort by the U.S. government and the 
industrial base to accomplish this enormous mission.  In the center of these efforts is the 
DLA, known as the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) until January 1, 1977 (DLA, 2012c).  
The DLA has continued to evolve since its inception in World War II (WWII).  The DLA 
website reports that “the origins of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) date back to 
World War II when America’s huge military buildup required the rapid procurement of 
vast amounts of munitions and supplies” (DLA, 2012c), which took detailed coordination 
to accumulate in the United States. 
In the early 1970s, the DLA continued to grow in its operations throughout the 
Vietnam War.  A 1974 Armed Services Committee report reflects the DLA’s (then DSA) 
growing responsibilities: 
On July 1, 1973, the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) assumed 
management responsibility for all DOD property disposal operations 
except those in Vietnam.  Subsequently, the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Installations and Logistics) directed DSA to assume 
responsibility for the disposal program in Vietnam as of January 1974.  
This assigns to DSA worldwide responsibility for all DOD disposal 
operations. (Comptroller General of the United States, 1974, p. 12) 
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Vietnam required immense efforts to retrograde all U.S. forces and properly 
dispose of excess equipment, but two decades later the DLA experienced equally 
monumental post-conflict operations with the technological, high-tempo war of 
Operation Desert Storm (ODS). 
In the aftermath of ODS, the DLA participated in and executed the multiphase 
Operation Desert Auction (General Accounting Office [GAO], 1992b, p. 1).  During 
Desert Auction, the DLA ensured the collection and disposal of mostly unserviceable 
items.  A GAO report stated, 
Through May 1992, the DRMO in Saudi Arabia received 56,127 line 
items with an acquisition value of $538.4 million.  This amount includes 
items still in inventory, items reused, items sold or transferred to foreign 
countries, and items abandoned or destroyed.  In addition, the DRMO in 
Saudi Arabia had a scrap inventory of 44.7 million pounds as of the end of 
May 1992. (GAO, 1992b, p. 4) 
Although half a billion dollars does not seem like a lot in terms of today’s trillion-
dollar budgets, Operation Desert Auction illustrates the level of work that the DLA 
organization is capable of executing and highlights the logistical challenges to come at 
the close of OEF. 
Disposal processes for excess equipment were eventually consolidated under 
DRMS, which is currently called Disposition Services within the DLA, as previously 
mentioned.  The Disposition Services website illustrates its importance and its recent 
operations: 
In fiscal [year] 2008, $2.2 billion worth of property was reutilized.  Every 
dollar’s worth of property reutilized is a tax dollar saved.  DLA 
Disposition Services also supports disaster relief at home, humanitarian 
assistance and foreign military sales [FMS] programs. (DLA, 2011a)     
2. Property Categories 
Government property is segregated into two broad categories: real property and 
personal property, as seen in Figure 3.  Personal property includes general military 
equipment ranging from aircraft carriers to pencils to MRAP vehicles, while real property 
is principally land, buildings, and other DoD structures (see Figure 3; Navin, 2010, 
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pp. 16, 18).  Personal property is subcategorized as non-standard equipment (NSE;  
i.e., commercially obtained items) or military-type property that has a hierarchal 
significance (see Figure 3) and dollar range depending on the individual defense article, 
like the multimillion-dollar MRAP program.  NSE procurement in OIF and OEF, funded 
predominantly with overseas contingency operations (OCOs) money, is typically for 
items not found on a Marine Corps table of organization and equipment (T/O&E).  
Instead, NSE procurement is for articles that help address urgent needs or minor gaps 
(e.g., low-powered lasers for escalation of force [EOF] equipment to reduce civilian 
casualties).  Additionally, per DoD 4160.20-M (ODUSD[L], 1997), military-type 
property being considered for disposal outside the United States or a U.S. territory is 
classified as foreign excess personal property (FEPP) (p. 9-1). 
 
 
Figure 3.  Property Classification Framework (From Navin, 2010, p. 40) 
The reuse of DoD equipment, which is categorized as reutilization, is a large 
program within the DLA and other federal agencies.  However, when discussing 
disposition approaches to military-type property (e.g., degraded high mobility 
multipurpose wheeled vehicles [HMMWVs] or MRAP vehicles), it is important to 
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differentiate between the DLA’s disposal operations abroad and stateside.  We only focus 
our research on the efforts to dispose, scrap, or resell excess equipment in and from 
Afghanistan. 
Disposing of FEPP has different forms and definitions.  One aspect of disposal 
can refer to FMS through EDA transfers to foreign allies, as we will describe in Section 
C of this chapter, and the DLA plays an important role in coordinating and executing 
FMS.  As described in the 2010–2017 Defense Logistics Agency Strategic Plan (DLA, 
2010a), the DLA “also partner[s] directly with the services to meet the needs of Foreign 
Military Sales customers. [They] support 115 allied nations with more than $2 billion in 
annual sales, playing a pivotal role in sustaining DOD’s Security Assistance Program” (p. 
2).  Disposal can also mean abandoning or destroying an item, or it could refer to the 
process of scrapping military equipment down to an unrecognizable and unusable state.  
These definitions are further described in following subsections.  
3. Definition of Code Conditions 
There are multiple sets of materiel condition codes used to classify the physical 
state of DoD equipment.  The federal condition code is the primary distinguishing 
classification in the Defense Materiel Disposition Manual, and it incorporates two 
subsets: supply and disposal condition codes (ODUSD[L], 1997, pp. xxii, 9-4).  Supply 
condition codes, as seen in Appendix A, are assigned by individual DoD components and 
are the basis for determining whether equipment or materiel is serviceable, in excess, or 
transferable to DLA’s Disposition Services (ODUSD[L], 1997, pp. xxii, 3-7).  Disposal 
condition codes, as seen in Appendix B, are assigned by Disposition Services after an 
item is received from the DoD component, inspected, and verified (ODUSD[L], 1997, 
pp. xxii).  For the purpose of this research and model, only federal condition codes, as 
seen in Appendix C, are utilized because they reflect the combination of both supply and 
disposal codes, and they establish “fair value rates” for determining an item’s potential  
transfer price (ODUSD[L], 1997, pp. xxii, 3-7, 9-4, 9-5).  The federal condition codes are 
alphanumerically categorized and are listed in Appendix C along with the associated fair 
value percentage rates.    
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4. Definition and Criteria for Abandonment and Destruction  
Abandoning and/or destroying military articles and supplies is a dire and extreme 
way of disposing of equipment, and this equipment disposition option prevents the 
Marine Corps from salvaging those defense articles or recouping any original acquisition 
costs.  Most commanders would consider this action the least desirable or acceptable 
method to retrograde their unit’s equipment and would consider it a means of last resort.  
However, abandonment and destruction (A/D) is detailed here in order to differentiate it 
from other disposal methods in DoD 4160.21-M (ODUSD[L], 1997).  Chapter 8 of the 
Defense Materiel Disposition Manual lists important criteria for A/D ( ODUSD[L],1997).  
One or more of the following conditions must be met for materiel to qualify for A/D 
(ODUSD[L], 1997, pp. 8-1, 8-2): 
• The materiel has been documented with health, safety, security, or 
environmental hazards. 
• U.S. or host country law, DoD policy, or military Service regulations 
indicate that the materiel cannot be reutilized, transferred, donated, or 
sold. 
• Donating the materiel has been determined and documented to be 
infeasible. 
• The property has no commercial value, meaning that the property has 
neither utility nor monetary value (either as an item or as scrap). 
• Sale of the property is uneconomical; that is, when the estimated costs of 
the continued care and handling of the property exceed the estimated 
proceeds of its sale and providing the estimated cost of disposal by A/D is 
less than the net sales cost. 
As the criteria indicate, A/D results in the total loss of accompanying equipment and 
resale value. 
5. Definition and Criteria for Scrapping  
Scrapping is a distinct process from A/D; scrapping requires that action be taken 
to demilitarize a defense article for some type of resale price.  An item is classified as 
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unserviceable or condemned (i.e., supply/disposal condition code H or S) by both the 
DoD component and DLA Disposition Services before it is properly scrapped 
(ODUSD[L], 1997, pp. 3.3-2, 3.4-2).  The DLA Disposition Services’ definition of scrap 
is “materiel that has no value except for its basic materiel content” (DLA, 2011b).  
Further criteria are necessary to achieve a maximum net benefit from this process: 
Scrap segregation at the generator’s [unit’s and service branch’s] location 
is mandatory to keep the cost of handling scrap property to a minimum, 
and to enhance the value of the scrap (commingled scrap reduces/destroys 
the value of the basic materiel content). The Site is available to furnish 
scrap segregation guidance and, when possible, containers for scrap 
segregation. (DLA, 2011b) 
Scrap proceeds are deposited either to the DLA Disposition Services Defense 
Working Capital Fund (DWCF) or to the U.S. Treasury to reimburse the individual 
Services (DLA, 2011b).  The three Disposition Services sites located in Afghanistan 
conduct scrapping primarily on battle-damaged equipment and also to help redistribute 
excess equipment to other units in need.  As highlighted in a recent article, “In an average 
month, they [the Disposition Services] receive an average 2.3 million pounds of scrap, 
verify the destruction of 350,000 pounds of demilitarization-required property and 
redistribute $1.6 million in usable property to other units” (DLA, 2012b).   
After DLA Disposition Services produces or accumulates enough scrap, it sells it 
to allied nations or on the open market via coordination with the State Department.  The 
DLA Disposition Services website for Bagram, Afghanistan states: 
Private companies and individual customers compete for property by 
participating in property sales which are ongoing.  Usually a sale is for one 
broad category of property.  Property is sold by local open or sealed bid 
auction, national sealed bid auction, or by negotiated sales when 
appropriate (e.g., with high-value items). (DLA, 2011b)  
It is possible that scrapping excess, damaged, or obsolete equipment will save the U.S. 
government and the DoD millions of dollars in transportation, handling, and 
refurbishment costs during a full retrograde from Afghanistan, and this process is a viable 
option for potentially hundreds of line items and defense articles. 
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C.   DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY  
Security cooperation is a critical dimension of U.S. national security.  The 
Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM; DSCA, 2003) defines security 
cooperation as “all activities undertaken by the DoD to encourage and enable 
international partners to work with the U.S. to achieve strategic objectives” (p. 35).  The 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is an organization within the DoD that 
maintains foreign ally relationships by building strategic resources to advance allied 
national security.  DSCA’s four core capabilities are international military education and 
training (IMET), foreign military financing (FMF), foreign military sales (FMS), and 
excess defense articles (EDA).  Each of the four capabilities fosters stronger ties with 
allies and enhances their military capabilities.  Arguments have been made that U.S. 
national security rests on its ability to “deter, defend against, and decisively defeat 
potential threats” by providing to our allies a “ring of access” (Williamson & Moroney, 
2002, p. 81) around future global hotspots with tools such as security cooperation.    
FMS provides various resources that most recently have been in support of 
requirements such as lethal defense articles that have helped equip the Iraqi and Afghan 
armies and police.  Upward trends in equipment sales from wars in both theaters via the 
FMS process are depicted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  Recent Foreign Military Sales Trends (From DSCA, 2012a) 
Delivery lead-times range from six months to two years for fulfillment of 
requested items to the customer, which is a common problem with FMS.  A recent report 
conducted by the Security Cooperation Reform Task Force highlighted the challenges of 
FMS, which supports 117 different countries.  The report was performed at the request of 
the Secretary of Defense and contained suggestions for making improvements in the 
following areas within FMS (DoD, 2011, pp. 5–6):  
• Security cooperation planning is oriented at responding to requirements rather 
than at anticipating them. 
• The FMS process has little ability to respond to urgent or unforeseen 
requirements. 
• “DoD lacks formal means to prioritize competing requirements for defense 
articles and services among partner countries, and between partner countries and 
United Stated forces.” (DoD, 2011, p. 6) 
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Equipment provided through FMS to a foreign state is new or used, as facilitated 
via the EDA transfer process for used or outdated defense equipment.  Studies completed 
by the Logistics Management Institute have claimed that retaining EDA from the 
Services and taking the long-term option of selling it to foreign nations via FMS would 
“generate 6 to 13 times more net revenue than disposal” (Kiebler, Horne, & Zimmerman, 
1994, p. iv).  With regard to excess defense articles, the SAMM states, “This excess 
equipment is offered at reduced or no cost to eligible foreign recipients on an ‘as is, 
where is’ basis.  The EDA program works best in assisting friends and allies to augment 
current inventories of like items with a support structure already in place” (DSCA, 2003, 
p. 492). 
As seen in Appendix C, EDA pricing is strictly enforced insofar that “items are 
priced between 5 to 50 percent of the original acquisition value depending on age and 
condition” (DSCA, 2003, p. 496).  The low-end yield of 5 percent suggests major repairs 
and revenue will range up to 50 percent depending on the serviceability condition code.  
The Logistics Management Institute study states, “It is substantially more cost-effective 
to retain assets within constraints than to dispose of them even if only 10 percent of the 
original demand forecast is sold” (Kiebler et al., 1994, p. 3-3).  
Over the years, there has been public concern about transferring defense articles 
with advanced technology.  An example of this concern is in a recent Congressional 
Research Service report that illustrates threats to national security (Kan, 2010, p. 2).  
However, when an EDA transfer is completed, the technologically sensitive materiel is 
removed, retained, and properly screened.   
The defense industrial base is one of many key stakeholders when these EDA 
transfers take place.  Transfers, some of which include long-term maintenance contracts, 
could benefit industry leaders such as Oshkosh, Northrop Grumman, or Lockheed Martin 
by opening a new customer base, as is the case with recent contracts for logistical support 
negotiated with Kuwait (DSCA, 2012b, p.1).   
Despite EDA transfers’ being conducted for many decades, a 1994 GAO report 
discussed the lack of a data management system to account for actual transfers of EDA as 
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well as Services that failed to follow DoD pricing directives and, as a result, understated 
the value of EDA transfers that were granted or sold (p. 2).  No financial gain is achieved 
by granting defense articles as opposed to selling them through FMS as an EDA grant.  
From data collected from DCSA, Figure 5 expresses the current transfer price of total 
EDA grants (Foreign Assistance Act [FAA], 1961, §§ 516, 517, 518, and 519) given to 
foreign nations versus EDA sales to alliances from 1992. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Total Price of Total EDA Transfers 
The total original acquisition price of defense articles is a much larger percentage 
of what the transfer price ends up being regardless of whether an EDA grant or EDA sale 
takes place.  As reliability of equipment depreciates and items therefore become less 
serviceable, the condition code designated by the service is lower, resulting in a further 
downward spiral in transfer price.  From data collected from DSCA, Figure 6 illustrates 
the percentage of original acquisition price of ground combat vehicles is predominately 
priced greater for EDA grants to foreign nations than it is for EDA transfers sold for a 
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Figure 6.  Percent Price of Vehicle EDA From Original Acquisition Price 
1. Excess Defense Article Transfer Process 
The EDA transfer process is dynamic, and no public lists exist of what is excess 
from all the different Services.  Therefore each country may exploit these excess 
resources on a first come, first served basis once a request is submitted to DLA.  The 
flow chart in Figure 7 displays the relationship between DLA and DSCA in regard to 
EDA transfers, referred to as “special programs” in this example, and further 
distinguishes DLA transfers from EDA transfers.  Figure 7 also illustrates the transfer 
process of the Service identifying an item that is in excess of their AAO and transferring 


















Year totals (1993-2011) 
 
Note. This data was collected by the researchers from DSCA. 
EDA Transfer Price Percentage of Original 
Acquisition  




No EDA Sales  
during this period 
 19 
 
Figure 7.  DLA Disposal Overview Flow Chart, March 2011 (From DLA, 2011c) 
Once equipment is identified as being beyond the needs of the service, the request 
is turned over to DLA.  DLA Disposition Services will place the equipment in one of four 
categories: transfer, reutilization, donation, and disposal (DLA, 2011c).  Examples of 
DLA transfers, also identified as FEPP in Chapter II, Section IIIB of this report, refer to 
scenarios when equipment is given to organizations such as the United States Department 
of Agriculture Forest Service.  Such a transfer could occur with something like excess 
DoD equipment for fire and emergency services (DLA, 2010b, p. 1).  When equipment is 
in the reutilization category, it is transferred to DSCA for further EDA processes, as 
illustrated in Appendix D of the previously mentioned 1994 GAO report (p. 13) and also 
is displayed in chapter 11 of the SAMM (DSCA, 2003).  Equipment in the category for 
donation would possibly go to organizations such as the Department or the National 
Association of State Agencies for Surplus Property (NASASP; 2010, p. 1), and 
equipment prepared for disposal would be demilitarized by DLA. 
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2. Restrictions  
As seen with most retrogrades in U.S. history, once the presidential exit strategy 
guidance is given, time is a critical factor due to the numerous steps involved.  To get 
authorization for the transference of EDA, Congress must be notified between 15 and 
30 days prior to execution, depending on the level of the transfer (GAO, 1994, pp. 10–
11).  At any rate, the detailed coordination between layers of agencies takes time as 
requests for U.S. excess equipment go through the requesting country, Department of 
Commerce, Department of State, DSCA, and the Services. 
The EDA transfer process time begins with the military Service identifying 
equipment that is in excess, not with the customer agent making a request for excess 
equipment.  Supply chain management has, in recent years, changed in the private sector 
from utilizing push logistics to now primarily providing pull logistics in an effort to 
reduce customer wait time.  Joint Publication (JP) 4-0 (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff [CJCS], 2008) points out the clear benefits of push and pull methods:  
“a combination of push and pull resupply will reduce unused or wasted space by adding 
predictability as well as combining compatible loads, thus resulting in a more effective as 
well as more efficient use of transportation assets and the logistic footprint in-theater” 
(p. 13).  Nevertheless, a push supply system is required in order to supply the customer 
base with excess materiel.  
Despite the type of logistical support, the poor economic stability of many foreign 
allies limits what is feasible with regard to EDA.  Foreign allies seeking excess 
equipment have to provide financial support for the transportation of any equipment 
(Navy International Program Office [NIPO], 2012).  This is a limiting factor that deters 
some foreign allies from obtaining the required assets to defend their national security 
with less expensive defense articles.  A second constraint is the foreign country’s lack of 
an industrial base sufficient to maintain sustainable technical knowledge for future 
repairs.   
The defense industrial base is a complex system that has grown over the years, 
capitalizing on directly equipping requirements for our warfighters.  In order for the 
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industrial base to remain active, foreign countries must procure lethal defense articles or 
maintenance contracts in order to sustain demand within the United States for Services, 
especially to “offset declining business at home” (Defense Institute of Security 
Assistance Management [DISAM], 1991, p. 56).  On the other side, the DoD requires all 
project managers to install anti-tamper measures on sensitive defense articles to protect 
reverse engineering and to maintain integrity, originality, and future demand for the 
defense industrial base (DoD, 2012, p. 77).  
D. UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 
Challenges to U.S. transportation requirements are nothing new to the military, as 
battles have been exclusively fought offshore ever since the Civil War.  Operations in 
Korea and later Vietnam demonstrated a need for rapid and reliable support requirements 
that prove challenging to orchestrate.  On October 1, 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Act 
established that all common-user DoD air, land, and sea transportation would be 
consolidated (1986, § 212(a) (3)).  The consolidation created United States 
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), the largest single authority for U.S. 
military transportation.  
The mission and responsibilities of USTRANSCOM are dynamic and supported 
through three component commands: Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift Command, 
and Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command.  As one of nine Combatant 
Commands, USTRANSCOM has a general support role (defined as “functional”) rather 
than a regional geographic responsibility.  There are two other functional combatant 
commands: U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Special Operations Command.  The 
mission of USTRANSCOM is as follows: 
Develop and direct the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise to 
globally project strategic national security capabilities; accurately sense 
the operating environment; provide end-to-end distribution process 
visibility; and responsive support of joint, U.S. government and Secretary 
of Defense-approved multinational and non-governmental logistical 
requirements. (USTRANSCOM, 2012a, para. 2) 
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Despite having no physical equipment under its direct responsibility, USTRANSCOM is 
charged with orchestrating the movement of the service components in and out of all 
theaters of operation.  To illustrate the complexities of this strategic function, we provide 
the following statistics: During Operation Desert Storm, USTRANSCOM was 
responsible for the movement of “nearly 504,000 passengers, 3.7 million tons of dry 
cargo, and 6.1 million tons of petroleum products in approximately seven months” 
(USTRANSCOM, 2012a, para. 6).  This is just the beginning of the colossal 
transportation demands subsequently seen in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring 
Freedom. 
Today, USTRANSCOM has not only coordinated logistics for the two major wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also delivered 26.2 million pounds of supplies during the 
unfortunate Pakistani flooding and 3,431 short tons of cargo during the horrific tsunami 
in Japan in 2011 (USTRANSCOM, 2012c).  In addition to humanitarian assistance, a 
multitude of other missions take place, such as the aerial delivery missions into 
Afghanistan totaling 80 million pounds of cargo (Fraser, 2012, p. 7).  Now 
USTRANSCOM coordination is becoming just as critical with the demands on 
transportation for the withdrawal from Afghanistan.   
USTRANSCOM maintains responsive support for logistical requirements partly 
due to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) that supplements military air support 
requirements when necessary.  As stated in a 2006 Congressional Research Service 
report,   
The airlines contractually pledge aircraft to the various segments of 
CRAF, ready for activation when needed.  To provide incentives for civil 
carriers to commit aircraft to the CRAF program and to assure the United 
States of adequate airlift reserves, the government makes peacetime airlift 
business available to civilian airlines that obligate aircraft to the CRAF. 
(Bolkcom, 2006, p. CRS-2) 
In most instances, the cost of buying a new plane will be much higher than using 
assets from the civilian air fleet by paying an as-required charter fee.  As seen during 
Operation Desert Storm, “AMC [Air Mobility Command] paid carriers about $1.5 billion 
for using their aircraft during the operation.  Purchasing additional aircraft to provide 
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similar capability would cost [the DoD] from $15 to $50 billion, according to Air Force 
officials, depending on assumptions used for aircraft replacement cost” (Bolkcom, 2006, 
p. 4).  
The maritime contingency program called Voluntary Intermodal Sealift 
Agreement (VISA) is similar to the CRAF arrangement for emergency strategic air 
support.  In regard to VISA, a 2009 Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) 
report stated, “It commits carriers to provide shipping capacity and allows shippers to 
carry military cargo alongside commercial cargo” (p. 3).  Speed is sacrificed when 
choosing to embark equipment by military sealift; nonetheless, the cost savings are 
significant compared to airlift when time is not a major constraint in planning.  Since the 
development of the shipping container, an increase in private- and public-sector container 
shipping has emerged.  The extent to which USTRANSCOM’s mission has increased 
with containers at sea is described by the DoDIG’s (2009) report: “more than 90 percent 
of all the equipment, fuel, and supplies needed to sustain the United States Military are 
carried by sea” (p. 1). 
General Fraser, the commander of USTRANSCOM told the Senate Armed 
Services Committee that “[Military] Surface Deployment and Distribution Command 
(SDDC) expanded into multimodal operations by moving over 3,500 pieces of mission 
essential cargo by commercial liner sealift with follow-on airlift into Afghanistan” 
(Fraser, 2012, p.3).  Multimodal operations are complex and require detailed coordination 
with the various combinations of air, sea, and/or land transportation to reach the final 
destination.  During 2010 and 2011, when requirements developed for M-ATVs in 
Operation Enduring Freedom, approximately 4,200 were delivered by various methods of 
multi-modal operations (USTRANSCOM, 2012c, p. 7). 
1. Transportation Working Capital Fund 
According to the DoD Financial Management Regulation (OUSD[C], 2008), all 
“Defense Working Capital Fund[s] consists of activity groups that are managed by DoD 
Components for providing goods and services, on a reimbursable basis, to other activities 
within the DoD and to non-DoD activities when authorized” (p. 1-5).  The purpose of a 
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working capital fund is to maintain funds from current operations that will be available to 
finance funding requirements for future operations without the end-of-year fiscal  
restrictions. With respect to USTRANSCOM, the Transportation Working Capital Fund 
(TWCF) is executed within the confines of the working capital fund as regulated by the 
DoD. 
 In order to meet financial obligations and future demands, funds can be managed 
through a working capital fund rather than through appropriations.  The working capital 
fund will break with time due to the “revolving fund” concept that will produce sufficient 
cash to balance expenditure costs.  DoD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R 
(OUSD[C], 2008) states, “The revenue collected from these ‘customers’ is used to pay 
for the acquisition of resources needed to ensure the continuous operation of the various 
working capital fund activities” (p. 19-3).  U.S. military operational requirements have 
been complex when managing finances for the TWCF.  USTRANSCOM’s Director of 
Program Analysis and Financial Management illustrates the challenges of the TWCF by 
stating: 
Working Capital Fund policy is to maintain 7 to 10 days of cash, or $400 
million to $600 million, for TWCF. Maintaining this level of cash has 
been very difficult to manage for the past several years because of volatile 
fuel prices and past congressional budget marks. Fortunately, the Air 
Force has helped by raising the cash management level to the Air Force 
WCF level—TWCF is a subset of the Air Force WCF. (Bentley, 2009, p. 
3) 
USTRANSCOM must meet all support requirements in order to meet operational 
demand.  This business model creates revenue, but nonetheless serves only as a cushion 
for the next requirement. 
To balance the TWCF over time, the charged transportation rates may increase or 
decrease as each general contract is signed.  The two main categories of funding 
requirements come from contractual (variable) costs and billing (fixed) costs.  The 
contract used for cost estimates is the Universal Service Contract-06 and it is updated as 
contractual rates change (USTRANSCOM, 2011).  As for billing rates, various situations 
will determine major differences in what the Service will be charged:   
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USTRANSCOM sets billing rates annually for three SDDC [(Military) 
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command] Fee for Service 
programs – Port Handling, Liner Ocean Transportation (container and 
break-bulk), and Global Privately Owned Vehicle (POV) Contract (GPC).  
Billing rates for these programs vary depending on the regional area and 
commodity or shipment type (import or export). (USTRANSCOM, 2012b) 
For the movement of equipment in and out of theaters of operation, transportation costs 
are major components in calculating total costs.  This requires a complex model for 
computing projected cost estimates for land, air, and sea transportation. 
2.   Universal Service Contract 
The Universal Services Contract (USC) governs the relationship between 
USTRANSCOM and the global transportation industry.  The contract is updated 
approximately once a year and defines costs for the movement of goods via all modes of 
transportation, including air, sea, and rail, as well as port operations.  Given that shipping 
transportation has been divided into bulk and break-bulk, these remain the two broad 
categories through which USTRANSCOM analyzes the array of charges for movement 
of military equipment (Levinson, 2006, p. 13). 
A few examples of the charges can be, but are not limited to, a drayage charge, 
line-haul charge, and liner-in or liner-out charges.  The drayage charge is the cost of 
moving equipment from an aerial or sea port to another destination ten or fewer miles 
away.  The current USC is USC-06, which defines drayage as “the movement … within a 
ten-mile radius of the city limits of that foreign port city, by means other than the 
Contractor’s principal vessels, such as by highway or railway” (USTRANSCOM, 2011, 
p. 49).  When using multiple modes of transportation, it is common to see a drayage 
charge included in transportation cost (or added to it).  It is challenging to ensure smooth 
and efficient transitions to the next mode of transportation when dealing with multimodal 
operations.   
The line-haul charge is the transportation of items from one location to another 
that requires more than ten miles in total distance.  The USC-06 defines line-haul as:  
The movement between the Contractor’s terminal at the port where the 
container is loaded to, or discharged from, the vessel and another place 
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outside of the Commercial Zone or modified zone of that United States 
port city or beyond a 10-mile radius of the city limits of that foreign port 
city by means other than the Contractor’s principal vessels, such as by 
highway, railway, canal or river, or in specific instances by feeder vessels, 
ferry or barge ship system. (USTRANSCOM, 2011, p. 50) 
Sea transportation costs utilize line-haul fees in the contract with commercial carriers and 
USTRANSCOM.  The liner in and liner out is expressed as loading or unloading vehicles 
from the aerial or sea port.  The USC-06 states the “Contractor is responsible for the 
loading and/or discharging of cargo at port of origin and/or destination and all costs 
associated thereto” (USTRANSCOM, 2011, p. 51).   
Many additional charges could apply depending on the need for port handling, 
cargo cleaning, security, enhanced in-transit visibility, and so forth.  In understanding 
transportation cost, the USC serves as a foundation to build total cost estimates for R4 
operations.  The challenge in giving accurate calculations versus estimates is that, as 
mentioned before, many different scenarios exist for multimodal movement, and there are 
various commercial carriers available for each service provided.    
E. MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS COMMAND 
The first supply depot in Marine Corps history, also known as the Quartermaster’s 
Depot, was established in 1880 at the Navy Yard, Philadelphia, PA.  With decreased need 
for supplies during post-war efforts, the Philadelphia depot closed, as did others such as 
Marine Corps Depots in San Francisco, CA; Norfolk, VA; San Diego, CA; and Pearl 
Harbor, HI (Rottman, 2002, p. 66).  Logistics and supply depots in the Marine Corps 
have seen an assortment of changes—like reductions in depots—but have also seen a 
number of organizational structure modifications (Morrison, 1994, p. 72).  Nevertheless, 
the flexibility on both east and west coasts is a critical element of logistical activities for 
maintenance, storage, and supply in the Marine Corps.    
Today, the Marine Corps Logistics Command (MCLC) headquarters is located in 
Albany, GA, and its mission serves as a critical component in our analysis of repair and 
rebuild costs for the vehicles returning from Afghanistan.  The MCLC mission and 
responsibilities reach much further than just depot maintenance, which include strategic 
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supply and prepositioning efforts around the world.  As seen in Figure 8, MCLC controls  
two subordinate commands and one forward command element: Blount Island Command 
in Jacksonville, FL, Marine Depot Maintenance Command in Albany, GA, and MCLC 
Forward (Fwd) in Afghanistan. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Marine Corps Logistics Command Organizational Chart (From 
MCLC, 2012b) 
The MCLC was created to streamline all major logistical processes in support of the 
operational needs of the warfighters.  The mission of MCLC is stated as follows: 
To provide worldwide, integrated logistics/supply chain and distributed 
management; depot level maintenance management; and strategic 
prepositioning capability in support of the operating forces and other 
supported units to maximize their readiness and sustainability and support 
enterprise and program level total life cycle management. (USMC, 2005, 
p. 1) 
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The challenge with the last chapters in today’s wars resides in having sufficient capacity 
for equipment repairs and navigating the uncertainty of total repair cost for each piece of 
equipment.   
Today, the presence of MCLC (Fwd) provides logistical services to units in 
Afghanistan while also supporting the Marine Corps’s Reset Strategy as the war comes to 
a close.  As highlighted in the Operation Enduring Freedom Ground Equipment Reset 
Strategy, the cost of repairs for equipment returning to depots will be 40–65 percent  of 
the replacement cost (USMC, 2012, p. 14).  Adding to the challenge is the fact that 
because most of the vehicles returning from Afghanistan are predominantly new 
procurements, such as the M-ATV or other MRAP vehicle variations, the cost 
estimations could be drastically different than what is expected.  In understanding total 
cost, the cost to repair equipment and the efforts of MCLC are a major part of the 
complex equation.  
F. BRIEF HISTORY OF FRANCE RETROGRADE 
Now we transition from the R4 stakeholder background information to the 
historical background on recent retrograde operations beginning in France.  The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) charter was signed in the late 1940s and France, 
the United States, and 10 other European nations took part in this accord.  American 
military presence in Europe still existed after 1945 until 1990 primarily to deter Soviet 
invasion (i.e., the Cold War), which explained Air Force and Army presences in France 
and Germany.  However, in 1966 General Charles de Gaulle, who at the time was the 
president of France, had retracted the country’s military obligations from NATO, which 
forced the United States to rapidly retrograde equipment and redeploy forces out of 
France.  This situation resulted in Operation Fast Relocation (Operation FRELOC). 
Upon Presidential guidance from the United States, a report was conducted in 
1968 discussing the shortfalls of moving all equipment out of France in a one-year time 
span.  The report indicated that the major redeployment and retrograde details 
encompassed “moving 70,000 personnel, disposing 800,000 short tons of supplies, 
relocating [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] to Belgium, evacuating 
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190 installations, and constructing new storage outside France” (GAO, 1968, p. 5).  Of 
those approximately 800,000 tons of materiel, the cost was $1.2 billion, and Congress 
reported its redistribution as follows: 320,000 tons to Germany, 145,000 to the United 
Kingdom, 90,000 to the United States, and 170,000 to disposal (Subcommittee on 
International Finance and Resources, 1975, p. 5). 
Operation FRELOC was a general success in terms of logistical requirements; 
nevertheless, due to the time constraints, problems arose with regard to EDA.  In 1967, 
equipment valued at $57.6 million was excess to the U.S. Army in France and not 
reported at the national level, making it unavailable for use to fill other gaps to other U.S. 
services and/or foreign allies (GAO, 1968, p. 15).  The GAO (1968) report indicated that 
“during Operation FRELOC, the Air Force shipped many items to Germany that were 
subsequently sold as scrap” (p. 16), highlighting the potential problems that arise with 
constrained timeframes.    
The result of the constrained timeframes created a ripple effect in Congress.  The 
Subcommittee on International Finance and Resources reported that none of the excess 
equipment granted had been used as leverage to pay off debt (1975, p. 1).  Paying off 
debt and leveraging financial obligations seemed difficult to manage as such a 
withdrawal effort was taking place.  The State Department reported in 1974 that 
equipment valued at $1.5 billion was given to the French as an EDA grant free of charge. 
Figure 9 shows a breakdown of this grant by Service (Subcommittee on International 
Finance and Resources, 1975, p. 17). 
 
 
Figure 9.  Breakdown of the Service’s Portion of the Grant (From 
Subcommittee on International Finance and Resources, 1975, p. 17) 
 30 
The U.S. efforts in France illustrate challenges created when a small window of 
time is given for retrograde.  What resulted from these time constraints was an enormous 
amount of EDA ($1.5 billion in total cost) given to the French; if more time had been 
allowed, better financial decisions could have been made, such as selling the items at a 
discount to our European allies.  Examination of Operation FRELOC is significant in 
order to analyze inadequate cost decisions during R4. 
G. BRIEF HISTORY OF VIETNAM RETROGRADE  
Operation FRELOC posed significant challenges in a short amount of time and 
serves as an interesting retrograde case study.  Unlike post-1966 in France, the Vietnam 
conflict required executing a drawdown while U.S. forces were still engaged in combat 
operations.  As stated in a 1973 Army Logistician article, “This is the first time that 
excess materiel has been identified, screened, and removed from a combat area while the 
fighting was still in progress” (Buswell, p. 29).  Vietnam is also relevant to today’s 
Afghanistan conflict and the eventual retrograde from there under similar difficulties and 
constraints.   
 The inevitable drawdown and reduction of U.S. forces in Vietnam was hastened 
due to vehement politics and waning public support at home.  However, the retrograde 
process necessitated pragmatic, detailed planning, especially due to the sheer amount of 
personnel and equipment requiring removal.  President Richard Nixon established that 
any troop reductions were incremental and predicated on “continued improvements 
within Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF),” or in other words, South Vietnam 
becoming governmentally and militarily self-reliant (GAO, 1973, p. 144).  In three years 
and 13 carefully staged drawdown increments, the following was accomplished: “the 
reduction of U.S. forces from 544,000 in June 1969 to 27,000 in December 1972 [that] 
included the withdrawal not [only] of U.S. personnel but [also] their equipment; 
concurrently, U.S. forces were improving RVNAF capabilities to minimize the impact of 
the U.S. redeployments” (GAO, 1973, p. 144).   
 Logisticians faced the monumental tasks of categorizing the condition of 
equipment, arranging transport, reselling, and scrapping materiel.  An early list of 
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retrograde and capacity issues were identified by a 1971 Comptroller General of the 
United States (1971a) “phasedown” progress report that assessed the first three 
withdrawal increments that totaled “a reduction of approximately 21% of the force” 
(p. 1).  Summarized below are a few of the constraints and bottlenecks documented in 
this report:  
• lack of uniform procedures among the Services, 
• equipment backlog at cleaning stations due to strict U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) standards, 
• “reporting and accounting system did not provide management with 
accurate, complete, or timely logistical data,” 
• “backlog of materiel awaiting shipment to the United States because of the 
lack of people qualified in packing and crating of materiel,” 
• failure to cancel requisitions for unnecessary equipment and supplies, 
• “significant backlog of reparable equipment in Vietnam mainly because of 
limited maintenance capabilities” (Comptroller General of the United 
States, 1971a, p. 2). 
Although these were significant challenges at the time, military personnel were able to 
move large amounts of equipment out of Vietnam in a relatively short period of time.  
The U.S. Comptroller General calculated that “during the first 8 months of fiscal year 
1970, Army depots in Vietnam were directed to ship excess serviceable secondary items 
and supplies valued at $297 million out of Vietnam” (1971a, p. 2). 
 However, not all equipment left Vietnam, and what was left required further 
classification for disposition, either as scrap or redistribution to allies.  During Vietnam, 
the Army’s Property Disposal Branch (PDB) was the lead agency for handling excess 
equipment; the PDB was essentially the predecessor of the current DLA’s Disposition 
Services.  In March of 1973, the PDB became subordinate to the Army Division within 
the American Embassy’s Defense Attaché Office (DAO), highlighting the importance of 
supporting foreign militaries through U.S. excess equipment (Comptroller General of the 
United States, 1974, p. 9).    
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 The PDB operated “five property disposal holding activities strategically located 
throughout Vietnam at Saigon Island, Ho Nai, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, and Da Nang” and 
in fiscal year (FY) 1973 “redistributed property having an original acquisition cost of 
$122 million and received $27 million in proceeds from the sale of property” (i.e., 
22 percent return; Comptroller General of the United States, 1974, p. 9).  Excess military 
equipment or defense article (EDA) sales generally went to the highest bidder and were 
based on a priority list published by the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller General of the 
United States, 1974, pp. 6–7).  For example, the August 1972 message had inter-service 
transfers to “U.S. Military Pacific Command” as the highest priority, second were sales to 
the “Cambodia Military Assistance Program (MAP),” and last priority was sales to other 
federal agencies (Comptroller General of the United States, 1974, p. 7). 
 In the early stages of deciding equipment disposition, an incidental constraint and 
noteworthy issue surfaced that restricted excess equipment sales to the RVNAF.  For any 
vehicle transfer, having a very low mileage was established as a strict requirement due to 
the limited maintenance capabilities of the RVNAF.  The thought was that higher mileage 
significantly increased the logistics and maintenance burden (Comptroller General of the 
United States, 1971b, p. 13).  Although a reasonable concern, a Comptroller General 
review elaborated that only “about 10 percent of the vehicles turned in by departing units 
were transferred to the RVNAF, even though the Vietnamese could have used many 
more” (1971b, p. 13).   For example, after the restriction of a 10,000-mile maximum for 
Jeeps was lifted to 20,000 miles, eligible vehicles quadrupled from 49 to 196, which 
provided more flexibility in leveraging equipment transfers and sells (Comptroller 
General of the United States, 1971b, pp. 13–14).   
 After the attempted transfer or sale of EDA, anything that “could not be sold 
[was] then disposed of as scrap” (Comptroller General of the United States, 1974, p. 6).  
Figure 10 illustrates the types of military equipment disposed and the scale of scrapping 
operations by the Army’s PDB.  Most equipment going to scrap was considered damaged 
beyond repair or obsolete without being resold or transferred as excess, but equipment 
from large bore howitzers to helicopters were reduced while in Vietnam. 
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Figure 10.  Scope of Demilitarization, January 1972 to March 1973 (From 
Comptroller General of the United States, 1974, p. 20) 
Additionally, scrap metal and other byproducts can be sold on the open market as raw 
materiel, giving the DoD an alternative option to finding returns on the original 
acquisition costs.  In the process of reducing the scrap inventory in 1973, the PDB sought 
out buyers in the “lucrative offshore markets,” and “a gross return of over 20 percent was 
realized and further sales were conducted in Singapore and in the Philippines” (Buswell, 
1973, p. 31). 
 The process of retrograding forces out of Vietnam was multifaceted and complex.  
It required significant logistical expertise, differing approaches to equipment disposition, 
and a team effort across the many departments of the U.S. government.  Although 
militarily unique in geography, politics, and operations, Vietnam was not a hasty 
withdraw or unanticipated logistical quagmire; it was a comprehensive case study with 
numerous lessons learned for future retrograde dilemmas and operations.  
H.  BRIEF HISTORY OF THAILAND RETROGRADE 
Less than 100 miles from Vietnam, American forces were deployed to Thailand in 
1961 to “preserve independence of South Vietnam,” facilitating responsive air support 
and strategic B-52 bomber strikes (Darling, 1967, p. 213).  In 1975, the number of 
Service members stationed in Thailand was approximately 27,000.  To put this number in 
context, it is the same amount of service members stationed in Okinawa during 2012.   
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With such a large U.S. military presence possibly straining U.S.–Thai relations, 
the United States eventually negotiated an agreement with the Royal Thai Government in 
1969 that began the withdrawal of U.S. troops and then agreed to further assess logistical 
requirements as needed for retrograde and redeployment (R2).  The final retrograde 
process began in March 1976 when the Royal Thai Government requested that the U.S. 
forces withdraw permanently from the six remaining U.S. bases in Thailand: Ubon, 
Nakhon, Phanom, Udorn, Korat, U-Tapao, and Ko Kha (GAO, 1977, p. 34).   
 According to the GAO (1977), the R2 effort was enormous and experienced many 
difficulties despite no combat operations concurrently taking place, unlike the withdrawal 
from Vietnam (p. 17).  Maintaining long-term relations with the Thai government by 
transferring equipment was a critical factor for R2 decisions (GAO, 1977, p. i).  
Stockpiles of ammunition were left behind to avoid large transportation costs, but the 
understanding was clear that Thailand had a valid requirement for the EDAs.  
Additionally, large volumes of communication equipment were also left behind with a 
three-year agreement with the United States for free usage of communication assets 
(GAO, 1977, p. 15).  Figure 11 displays equipment retrograded from Thailand specific to 
each base.   
 
Figure 11.  Retrograded Equipment from Thailand (From GAO, 1977, p. 33) 
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The Pacific Air Force was given authority by the State Department and the DoD 
for disposal operations.  However, disposal operations of excess equipment were not 
feasible because the Royal Thai Government controlled facets such as the transportation 
nodes, agriculture inspections for equipment departing the country, and contractors 
working, which proved difficult for U.S. logisticians conducting R2 operations (GAO, 
1977, p. 7).   
A key to understanding the eventual success Thailand retrograde operations out of 
Thailand was that each Service was given the autonomy to make judgment calls on 
whether equipment was deemed to be in excess.  The FMS transfers of EDAs to the 
Royal Thailand Government included vehicles, construction materiel, and repair parts 
that were estimated to be $235 million (GAO, 1977, p. 10).  These transfers of EDA sales 
were of financial gain to the United States, which stands in contrast with the nonexistent 
revenue gained in granting EDAs.     
The Thailand example illustrates an understanding of the Thai government’s valid 
military defense requirements that the United States exploited as R4 efforts took place.  
Even today, the United States maintains a positive rapport with Thailand, as exemplified 
by the III Marine Expeditionary Force annual exercise Cobra Gold.  The reason to study 
the Thailand withdrawal effort is to better grasp achieving the target of financial 
opportunity and assessing when to transfer EDAs and avoid large transportation costs.   
I.   BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FIRST GULF WAR RETROGRADE 
Operation Desert Storm (ODS) in 1991 was a very swift military operation that 
resulted in immediate logistical retrograde and redeployment requirements.  Major 
General William Pagonis, who was the senior logistician of retrograde operations for 
ODS (later named Operation Desert Farewell [ODF]), suggested lessons learned in his 
book Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War.  After 
the first four months of ODF, General Pagonis’ team had “cleaned and shipped more than 
117,000 wheeled and 12,000 tracked vehicles, 2,000 helicopters, and 41,000 containers 
of supplies”  (Pagonis & Cruikshank, 1992, pp. 157–158). 
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The R2 after swift military operations required well-orchestrated reverse logistics.  
The GAO (1992a) reported that the U.S. military utilized “576 ships and 10,002 aircraft 
containing equipment and supplies” (p. 8).  It also reported that the “U.S. military 
personnel at the airport [of embarkation] processed 354,900 service members” (p. 8).  
With such a large military buildup of resources, excess materiel was a costly challenge.  
As stated in the GAO (1992a) report: “In December 1991, DoD estimated that units 
returning from Southwest Asia had about $3.4 billion of excess materiel that should 
eventually be returned to the components supply system” (p. 16). 
Disposal and reutilization facilities were set up by DLA in Saudi Arabia to 
facilitate the R2 operations, as mentioned in Chapter II, Section A of this report.  The 
Services turned over to DLA excess equipment, such as 980 vehicles that were either 
“sold to Bahrain under Foreign Military Sales or were transferred to Greece under the 
Southern Region Amendment” (GAO, 1992b, p. 5).  Most the vehicles were donations 
made by Germany, but a number of them were unserviceable vehicles from the U.S. 
military.  Additionally, such equipment was made available to foreign states such as 
Germany, who faced these issues with the transferred equipment (GAO, 1992b, p. 7): 
• the cost of shipping, including shipping from the port and transportation to the 
port; 
• the understanding that most of the equipment was not operational; 
• the problems of repairing foreign-made equipment in the United States; and 
• the customs laws that prohibited or made difficult the import of such items to the 
United States and agricultural standards that dictated that the equipment be 
cleaned. 
Even though these were specific barriers for transferring EDAs to foreign nations, 
the problems also directly impacted the United States, limiting options for R2.  What the 
ODS retrograde exemplifies is that even with swift military operations, the logistical trail 
to retrograde will still be challenging.  Efforts such as Operation Desert Auction can be 
helpful in transferring items that are deemed economically unsuitable when large 
transportation costs are considered. 
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J.   HISTORY OF THE SECOND GULF WAR RETROGRADE 
Shortly after the Obama administration entered office in 2009, OIF was renamed 
Operation New Dawn, later resulting in an epic logistical challenge and the beginning of 
a massive retrograde, redeployment, in support of reset, and reconstitution (R4) effort in 
early 2009.  While visiting Camp Lejeune, NC, in February 2009, President Obama told 
Marines that the end of the war in Iraq would take place by the end of 2011; nonetheless, 
strategic and complex planning was necessary well before this announcement (White 
House, 2009).  The reasons for such extensive planning with Iraq were nine years of 
episodic conflict, the size of the logistical footprint—which was far greater than that of 
any conflict since Vietnam—and the hybrid use of contractor and military forces.  The 
total costs of R4 have been consistently reported in the billions, with many unknowns in 
the coming years, such as maintenance capacities, capabilities, and actual time for 
complete reset. 
There is debate on what the complete financial burden has been and will be for 
OIF, due in part to the unknown actual retrograde costs.  Some analysts, such as Nobel 
Prize–winning economist Joseph Stiglitz, state that the true cost is between $1–3 trillion 
(Trotta, 2008).   Putting the retrograde in context, according to the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO), “the equipment associated with forces in Iraq as of the fall of 2009 could 
weigh 750,000 tons and fill between 37 and 74 large sealift ships” (Tierney, 2009, p. 7).  
As convoys, lowboy trailers, and flatbed trucks made the journey toward Camp Arifjan in 
Kuwait, the final retrograde of MRAP vehicles continued several months after the official 
end of the war (Hansen, 2012, para. 1).    
1. Complexities 
As of July 2008, nearly 75 percent of all combat operation casualties were due to 
IEDs (GAO, 2009, p. 1).  As a result of IEDs, the defense industrial base developed 
armor-enhanced equipment and V-shaped hull for U.S. Service members to use during 
vehicular convoys.  The impetus to acquire the MRAP vehicle was one of the most 
needed requirements in Iraq and one of the most urgent acquisition procurements made in 
recent U.S. history.   
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The Defense Priorities and Allocation System (DPAS) is used by the DoD when 
filling demand for acquisition requirements of different priority thresholds.  The highest 
priority rating is DX-rating, which requires Presidential approval and is given to those 
items deemed necessary for national security.  Presidential approval was required for 
MRAP vehicles for the Global War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Further 
acquisition restrictions were put in place on partnering nations wanting to procure MRAP 
vehicles because of the demand to first outfit American units in Iraq and Afghanistan.       
Due to this complex situation, the DoD requested that the RAND Corporation 
analyze the alternatives, feasibilities, and courses of actions for different timelines on the 
exit of Iraq (Perry, 2009, p. xv).  The resulting report, authored by W. L. Perry, simplified 
the logistical drawdown into two main categories: military vehicles and all other items 
(predominantly containerized; Perry, 2009, p. 29).  With regard to military vehicles, 
logistical constraints and bottlenecks existed for returning equipment from Iraq to the 
United States during the war drawdown (Perry, 2009, p. 29).  The overriding reasons 
Perry gave to support the claim that withdrawal from Iraq would be a logistical burden 
can be summed up in two areas: wash racks and agricultural inspections, which were 
flashbacks from Vietnam.  First, the report indicated that throughput capacity would be 
overwhelmed at the wash racks prior to embarking equipment on ships in Kuwait (Perry, 
2009, p. 40).  Second, customs inspections at the border of Kuwait and Iraq would be 
weighed down by an overload of vehicles and tactical trailers. 
Another issue is the service life remaining in equipment returning from Iraq is 
uncertain.  General Michael Hagee, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, testified to 
Congress on the service life of ground combat vehicles as seen in Figure 12 (Korb, 
Bergmann, & Thompson, 2006, p. 7).  Figure 12 shows a comparison of the service life 
of vehicles not deployed to Iraq and those that have been in the combat theater of Iraq. 
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Figure 12.  Representation of Ground Combat Vehicle Service Life (From Korb 
et al., 2006, p. 7) 
2. Courses of Action 
After examining the courses of action taken, the Marine Corps’ overall approach 
was similar to the approach of other Services: to smooth out unforeseen obstacles in the 
system by using the concept of reverse supply chain logistics (Marine Corps Center for 
Lessons Learned [MCCLL], 2010, p. 2).  Through a methodical and successful process, 
the flow of equipment in the early stages allowed for decision-makers and data analysts 
to reduce equipment size, redistribute equipment, and utilize the DLA as a primary 
source during retrograde operations.  In order to identify potential challenges, 
Headquarters, Marine Corps mandated a “prime the pump” (i.e., perform a system test) 
standard that required 10 percent of ground tactical vehicles be sent to their home station 
regardless of whether the equipment was deemed in excess or required maintenance 
repairs.  The categories of decisions on retrograde were based on sending gear to CONUS 
or redistributing to fill needed equipment gaps for OEF.   
Because combat and training operational commitments in Iraq took place 
continuously with retrograde operations, the feasibility of screening equipment identified 




review boards were conducted by members in the Marine Expeditionary Force 
operational planning staff along with a multitude of stakeholders, sometimes on as many 
as 22 different occasions (MCCLL, 2010, p. 15).  Additionally, while retrograde 
operations took place, the training and transitioning of forces required the Iraqi army and 
police to use U.S. vehicles that were simultaneously being considered excess equipment. 
Once the Marine Corps completed this retrograde screening process in Iraq, the 
approval to take equipment off the records and label it “excess” flowed through various 
organizations.  An example of the approval authorization required were the using unit, 
the battalion, the regiment, the division, the Marine Expeditionary Force forward element 
headquarters, Multi-national Forces West, Marine Forces Central Command, Plans 
Policies and Operations, Installation and Logistics, Multi-National Security Transition 
Command Iraq, Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Navy 
International Programs Office, and then Marine Corps Systems Command (USMC, 2009, 
p. 22).  After screening equipment for future action by the Marine Corps, DLA would 
ultimately decide if equipment labeled “excess” could then be sold or granted to foreign 
allies.  
A systematic retrograde began in early 2009.  MCCLL reported the equipment 
flow over the period 2009–2010 was about 15,000 items per week, or approximately four 
battalion-sized Marine Corps elements (MCCLL, 2010, p. 14).  Using lessons learned 
from ODS, USTRANSCOM had a variety of pilot programs to improve supply-chain 
visibility.  For example, the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command 
maintained a Lean Six Sigma organization to improve throughput once all containers and 
vehicles arrived and processed through Kuwait (Johnson, 2010, p. 18).  Despite 
completing the retrograde, the MCCLL (2010) made the following statement: “As a 
MAGTF [Marine Air-Ground Task Force], we’re supposed to be expeditionary and when 
we have a MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force] with 11,000 containers, we’re really not 
expeditionary anymore” (p. 18).  Much like the container situation, this statement further 
stresses the issue of a reduced expeditionary capability for the bulky Marine Corps 
ground tactical vehicles.     
 41 
3. Cost Estimates 
The Reset Cost Model was used by the Marine Corps to develop cost estimates to 
assist planners with analyzing thresholds for determining whether equipment from Iraq 
was to be retrograded (USMC, 2009, p. 25).  Four broad categories were used, based on 
the condition of the equipment: 
• No Reset: The condition of the equipment is stable enough to return to the 
home station. 
• Depot: The maintenance cost will be 65% of procurement costs. 
• Field: The maintenance cost will be 20% of procurement costs. 
• Procure: Equipment is needed via the acquisition process (if AAO is 
deficient). 
Planners used these categories to make retrograde decisions that justified the use of 
resources and extended equipment usage for OEF if requirements for certain items 
existed in Afghanistan (USMC, 2009, p. 25).  
 Reporting the total cost of retrograde was dependent on what phase of the 
operation was being analyzed.  For example, the cost to retrograde a single MRAP 
vehicle—to get it from Kuwait to the U.S. East Coast by sealift—using 2012 pricing 
based on the USC-06 is approximately $18,000.  Additionally, there is a billing rate 
issued to the Service being supported, which for this example is approximately $22,000 
in 2012 dollars.  This billing rate total is slightly larger than the contract cost; 
nonetheless, the aforementioned estimate captures only the (coast to coast) transportation 
cost excluding first destination transportation costs (OCONUS), costs in CONUS, and 
those costs required to reset as deemed necessary by the Reset Cost Model.  Additionally, 
this transportation was computed only for sea transportation.  If air transportation 
requirements were needed, as in Afghanistan, an additional $11,386 per flight (variable 
costs) and air billing rates (fixed costs) per hour would be factored in when using 
strategic airlift (Gertler, 2010, p. 2). 
As the focus has shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan, HQMC began collecting data 
and conducting simulations for the eventual return of equipment.  An example is the 
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Ground Equipment Management Simulation-Marine Corps (GEMS-MC) process map for 
R2, which is a current initiative at HQMC, Installation and Logistics (I&L), Logistics 
Operations Analysis Division (LX) for cost estimation.  GEMS-MC has the capability to 
forecast resource decisions over time.  The model also estimates the average time it takes 
equipment to reach final reconstitution, transportation cost, utilization rate at depots, and 
major bottlenecks. 
K.   CURRENT INITIATIVES IN AFGHANISTAN 
Every war the United States enters eventually concludes with the gradual or 
immediate withdrawal of combat troops and equipment.  Many factors weigh on the 
urgency and expediency of a retrograde, including geopolitical dynamics, public opinion, 
and events on the ground in the area of operations.  Numerous historical examples 
illustrate these issues, such as the 1967 NATO/France fallout and sudden withdrawal of 
the U.S. military (Chapter I, Section IIA of this report), the extensive retrograde of 
Vietnam from 1970 to 1974 during continuous combat operations, and the early U.S. 
pullout of Iraq in 2011 due to a conflict in the Status of Forces Agreement. 
 
 
Figure 13.  Photo of Last American Combat Unit Leaving Iraq  
(From Morones, 2011) 
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The trend of retrograding under unpredictable constraints and conditions is not 
likely to change for any military, and the withdrawal from Afghanistan, ending OEF, will 
be no exception.  The anticipated constraints for that end game could very well be the 
most difficult experienced in U.S. history due to the previously stated factors and major 
geographical limitation of Afghanistan—a landlocked country with the closest port of 
Karachi, Pakistan, 1,000 miles away.  Another constraint the U.S. will face in 
withdrawing from Afghanistan is that the surged violence in 2008 and 2009 increased the 
presence of U.S. troops (and gear), requiring more logistics to return home.   
1. Complexities and the Northern Distribution Network 
The route to Karachi is called the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication 
(PAKGLOC), and it presents more problems for U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan than 
just distance.  Since November 26, 2011, the PAKGLOC has been closed due to a cross-
border incident between U.S. and Pakistani forces that killed 24 of the latter’s troops 
(“Pakistan,” 2011).  This resulted in the PAKGLOC being shut off to U.S. resupply 
missions and left the DoD and military logisticians scrambling for a new route.  
Currently, various routes through the Central Asia region, or through the “Stans,” are 
available, but each of these routes means traveling through countries with unique 
governments and sometimes unpredictable decision-making by their leaders.   Figure 14 
shows a simplified version of these extensive routes.  The green lines represent rail 
transportation through various countries and the red line highlights the roundabout long-
haul route for trucks.  This entire transportation network is called the Northern 
Distribution Network (NDN), and the U.S. military now heavily relies on it.   It is also 
multimodal, meaning cargo has to switch between different types of transportation (e.g., 
rail to ship to truck).  As reported on by the deputy chief of staff, logistics, Army G-4, the 
NDN “route is long and is three to four times more expensive than the PAKGLOC” and 
the use of “multiple modes of transportation … increases the costs” (Lopez, 2012).   
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Figure 14.  Map of Northern Distribution Network  
(From USTRANSCOM, 2012c) 
 This new position that the U.S. faces in resupplying troops is obviously precarious 
and underscores the political sensitivity of keeping viable routes open.  As Kuchins and 
Sanderson (2010) conveyed in their Center for Strategic and International Studies report, 
“understanding the dimensions of and knowing how to manage the geopolitical 
challenges and opportunities associated with NDN transit states and other key players is 
critical for the United States” (p. 1).   The growing conflict in Syria, which has been 
evolving over the past months (April–June 2012), is a testament to this conundrum.   
Why does Syria matter to the NDN?  As media reports have shown, the Syrian regime 
has intentionally killed hundreds of civilians.  Although the international community and 
the U.S. Department of State (DoS) have condemned these actions, Russia has essentially 
sided with Syria by vetoing any U.N. Security Council resolution on the Syrian issue.  
Further accusations have been made by the DoS that Russia recently supplied military 
attack helicopters to assist Syria in suppressing the anti-Assad rebellion.  As Figure 14 
illustrates, cooperation with Russia is essential if the U.S. is to have access to multiple 
lines of communication critical to OEF resupplies.  Russian cooperation is so essential 
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that the DoD has contradicted previous statements or toned down any unfavorable 
messages with respect to Russian support of the Syrian regime. 
2. Major Decisions and United States Marine Corps Policy 
Recognizing the challenges ahead, the USMC has already initiated guidance on 
retrograding from Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom Ground Equipment Reset 
Strategy (USMC, 2012), signed by the Commandant.  The policy reiterates the previous 
reset strategy from OIF as well as the immediacy, expected simultaneous stresses, and 
importance of correctly conducting an OEF retrograde.  It explicitly states, 
It is imperative the Marine Corps promotes simplicity and unity of effort 
throughout all aspects of the reset process.  The complexities involved 
with transitioning the force in stride are great.  Executing reset actions 
until completed will be complicated by geography, limited distribution and 
deployment options, potential acceleration of redeployment timelines and 
tightening of OCO funding. (USMC, 2012, p. 6) 
As this quote makes clear, the concern and urgency for a feasible retrograde strategy is 
increasing; all variables and options must be considered, including transportation costs, 
future refurbishment and maintenance costs, disposing of equipment through FMS or 
scrapping, required AAOs or item allowances, achievable timelines, and route capacity.  
The approaching OEF retrograde is truly a politically susceptible and complex strategic 
problem that will require a consolidated effort by multiple sectors of government (e.g., 
the DoD, DoS, Congress, etc.). 
 In summary, every step in the retrograde phase of OEF will have to be methodical 
to ensure combat equipment returns to the U.S. or is properly disposed of.  Safely 
bringing back every American troop and civilian is equally important, and calculated 
options and insightful politics are a necessity for the retrograde plan.  It is still unclear 
whether the U.S. military will leave Afghanistan orderly and peaceably as it did in OIF, 
or whether it will confront a full carrier deck as it did in evacuating Saigon in 1975, only 
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III. DATA COLLECTION, CONCEPTS, AND MODEL 
In this chapter, we illustrate the data collected, reintroduce the conceptual FBCR4 
& AoA model, and present the FBCR4 & AoA model strategic view along with details of 
inputs and outputs from the cost model.  We do this by describing the sources of data 
collection, laying out the cost elements in the FBCR4 & AoA model, and then discussing 
the tie-in from the conceptual view to the strategic view of the model.  
A.  DATA COLLECTION 
 In this section, we identify and describe the data we utilized and the sources.  To 
exemplify the complexities of estimating the cost for R4 with vehicles, data was required 
from seven different stakeholders with significantly different missions in order for us to 
piece together the cost estimate.  There are three challenges in developing R4 cost 
estimates: (1) some activities are not being properly measured or tracked; (2) there are 
many possible scenarios for transportation; and (3) it is undetermined which cost drivers 
are most relevant.   
1. Transportation Costs from USTRANSCOM 
We collected the transportation cost data from USTRANSCOM and its 
component commands, such as Surface Deployment Distribution Command (SDDC) and 
Air Mobility Command (AMC).  We dissected each of the costs in order to determine 
what the Marine Corps is charged, as well as to understand if there are any other costs 
that are not included.  We used the USC-06 general contract (as of March 2011) to collect 
ocean break-bulk rates, line-haul rates, and all accessorial fees such as washing, security, 
and tarping.  We also received an update to data from SDDC, which further allowed us to 
estimate transportation costs by air, ground, and sea by the most current contract.   
We used data calculations from AMC (2011), the Air Mobility Planning Factors, 




vehicles permissible to load on an aircraft.  The FY2012 Transportation Working Capital 
Fund (TWCF) Planning Factors data set was used to estimate the cost per flight hour of 
military air lift.   
2. OEF Equipment Density List from HQMC, I&L, LX 
The GEMS-MC data provided from HQMC, I&L, LX established a baseline 
quantity for equipment currently on hand in Afghanistan and in inventory within the 
Marine Corps.  The same data set had been utilized for the GEMS-MC simulation tool by 
HQMC and other government data analysts in order to provide time and cost estimations.  
Our data from HQMC, I&L, LX’s equipment density list displays table authorized 
materiel control number (TAMCN), nomenclature, dimensional data, equipment totals, 
and each associated owning Marine Corps unit.  Not every equipment type was used; 
nevertheless, with the use of our model, other vehicular equipment TAMCNs can be 
examined instead of the specific combat vehicle we used for the model. 
3. Reset Percentages from HQMC, I&L, LX 
HQMC, I&L, LX also provided reset data from the Ground Equipment Reset 
Playbook (I&L, 2012) that was provided from HQMC, I&L, LX.  This data consisted of 
TAMCNs, nomenclatures, national stock numbers, percentage totals of equipment that 
will go to the depot, require field maintenance, or need new acquisitions as it was 
determined by HQMC.  The data was consistent with the equipment density list 
mentioned earlier and was also provided by HQMC, I&L, LX.  Repair costs are estimated 
as a percentage of replacement cost as follows: (1) if no depot maintenance is required, 
then costs range from 0–25%; (2) if depot maintenance is required, then costs range from 
40–65%; and (3) if cost estimates are more than 65% to repair, then full replacement is 
projected.  The determined percentages of equipment requiring reset have potential for 
being a significant cost element when 65% is used in the FBCR4 & AoA model. 
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4. OCONUS Activity Times from MCLC (Fwd) 
The data for time-intensive activities was sourced from MCLC (Fwd).  This data 
consists of averages and estimates of the current ongoing retrograde situation with each 
of the processes involved with R4 operations for Marine Corps vehicles.  A labor cost 
estimate is derived for the OCONUS R4 tasks military Service members and civilian 
contractors while deployed in theater. 
5. Contractor Labor Estimates from Marine Corps Logistics Command, 
Blount Island Command 
MCLC, Blount Island Command has responsibility for overseeing the current 
contract for civilian employees conducting R4 operations.  The cost estimates include the 
average labor cost for both Camp Leatherneck and Forward Operating Base (FOB) 
Dwyer and add in other direct and indirect burdened costs to illustrate an hourly cost of 
the contractor work.  Differences exist when analyzing military and civilian contractor 
pay rates for services in a warzone, so it is relevant to differentiate this labor cost data 
into the model when evaluating cost estimates for the various processes in OCONUS. 
6. EDA Transfer Data from DSCA 
The DSCA provided data that enabled us to analyze the trends of equipment 
transfers from 1993 to 2011.  The data comprised of every line item either sold or given 
to various allied countries.  We needed this to analyze data specific to vehicles over this 
20-year period and provide analysis for alternative solutions to the issues discussed in 
this report. 
7. Revenue and Scrap Quantity from DLA 
The DLA provided data on scrap metal quantities for Afghanistan and Iraq from 
2005–2011, broken down by area of operations and particular DLA disposition site.  We 
received a twelve-month data set that displayed scrap metal quantities and actual funds 
exchanged with local vendors in Afghanistan.  The DLA also provided a graphical 
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depiction that illustrated the average labor and time required to completely scrap one 
MRAP vehicle.  We were able to analyze the costs associated from disposal of vehicles 
and compare with other methods.   
B.  FULLY BURDENED COST OF RETROGRADE, REDEPLOYMENT, 
RESET, AND RECONSTITUTION AND ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
We propose a new paradigm to measure, the FBCR4 & AoA, as a way to help 
commanders more accurately gauge costs with R4 and therefore make better forecasts.  
The FBCR4 & AoA estimates labor and materiel for OCONUS costs, transportation 
costs, CONUS costs, and depot costs, and the model further provides cost estimations of 
the alternatives.  The purpose of FBCR4 & AoA is to equip logistical planners and 
Marine Corps officials with the tools they need to make sound financial and management 
decisions for retrograde and reset.  The theoretical idea of FBCR4 & AoA is to provide 
an estimate of the cost of returning equipment from OCONUS to the owning unit’s 
military installation.  We have configured the FBCR4 & AoA into a strategic process that 
is comprised of two cost paths and four major areas of expenditures in labor and materiel, 
as shown in Figure 15, and we further describe the purpose and method behind each step.  
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Figure 15.  The FBCR4 & AoA Conceptual View 
1. OCONUS Theater Activities Labor Cost 
The purpose of the OCONUS theater activities labor cost step is to quantify the 
labor time required for the various activities and labor preparations required to prepare a 
particular piece of equipment for its first stage of transportation after combat operational 
requirements have ceased for it.  The activities include all preparation processes needed 
to retrograde the equipment: washing the vehicles, dispatching, conducting limited 
technical inspections (LTI), completing agricultural inspections, and embarking the 
equipment.  The labor time for activities such as contractor and military pay is identified 
and then summed with all other labor activities. 
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2. OCONUS Theater Activities Materiel Cost 
The OCONUS theater activities materiel cost’s purpose is to calculate the cost of 
all materiel that requires further preparation to get to the first stage of transportation once 
combat operational requirements have ceased.  The manner in which this is done is to 
sum the average gallons of water utilized for vehicle cleaning, gallons of fuel utilized 
and/or purged, batteries, and radio frequency identification tags. 
3. OCONUS Transportation Labor Cost  
The purpose of the OCONUS transportation labor cost is to calculate all labor 
utilized after the start of the first stage of transportation until the arrival of the equipment 
to the first CONUS aerial or sea port.  The labor includes not only military labor, but also 
the cost of civilian pay associated with air, sea, or ground transportation.  However, this 
step is separate from the activities as mentioned next in Step 4, which is associated with 
the USC-06 contract.  Therefore, the method for this step is to sum labor for various 
activities involved in the transportation activities that are specifically handled by military 
personnel.   
4. OCONUS Transportation Materiel Cost 
 In OCONUS transportation materiel cost, we sum all materiel utilized after the 
initial stage of transportation until the arrival of the equipment to the first CONUS aerial 
or sea port.  We obtain cost estimates from the commercial carriers as in USC-06.  We 
assume that labor for these activities is built into the contract and add all accessorial 
charges to the transportation mode cost.  The labor cost discussed in the aforementioned 
step is distinguishable from OCONUS transportation materiel cost.  In situations with air 
transportation, the cost per flying hour to the government is included in this cost rather 
than the cost to the Service.  For sea, rail, or line-haul charges, the rates will be followed 
in accordance with USTRANSCOM. 
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5. CONUS Transportation Labor Cost 
The purpose of CONUS transportation labor cost is to calculate all labor 
associated with processes once equipment arrives at the first aerial port of debarkation 
(APOD) or sea port of debarkation (SPOD) through the travel to either the depot or 
military installation.  The approach is to include labor cost for all port operations, 
transportation to depot, and travel from depot to the unit’s installation. 
6.   CONUS Transportation Materiel Cost 
The CONUS transportation materiel cost’s purpose is to sum all the materiel cost 
in CONUS upon arrival at the first APOD or SPOD through the travel to either the depot 
or military installation.  The method is to summate the fuel, drayage charges, line-haul 
charges, and any additional service rendered, such as cargo cleaning at the CONUS port. 
7.   CONUS Depot Labor Cost 
The purpose of the CONUS depot labor cost is to calculate all labor utilized to 
reset and reconstitute the equipment either at the assigned depot or at the military unit’s 
installation.  The approach we utilize calculates all labor directly involved in maintenance 
activities to restore the equipment. 
8.   CONUS Depot Materiel Cost  
The purpose of CONUS depot materiel cost is to calculate all materiel associated 
to reset and reconstitute equipment either at the assigned depot or at the military unit’s 
installation.  The method is to calculate costs for all the supply parts and resources 
needed to complete the reset and reconstitution effort.  This is the last step to comprise 
Cost Path 1. 
9. Alternative of Analysis for Cost Path 2 
The AoA for Cost Path 2 calculates potential cost savings/loses in the case of 
EDA vehicle sales or scrapping.  The method used assumes all costs in Steps 1 and 2 at 
the OCONUS theater activities will be incurred.  In the case of EDA, this step replicates 
historical revenue from EDA grants/sales and transfers to foreign alliances via DoS.  The 
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other alternative summates labor and materiel to conduct scrapping and calculates 
potential funds exchanged from local scrap sales.  
C. STRATEGIC VIEW OF THE MODEL  
These cost factors are at the core of the FBCR4 & AoA estimating tool, which is 
comprised of all OCONUS and CONUS activities.  The conceptual view (Figure 15) of 
our model transitions directly into our strategic view (Figure 16) by illustrating the key 
decision points and a work breakdown structure of the phases from the beginning to the 
end of the retrograde process.  Appendix H illustrates in detail the FBCR4 & AoA 
strategic model flow chart, as seen in Figure 16, and provides the cost line items utilized 





















Figure 16.  The FBCR4 & AoA Model Strategic View 
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IV. MODEL ANALYSIS 
A. FBCR4 COST ESTIMATIONS 
In this section we describe the layout of the base case model and a breakout of 
specific details in estimating the cost for scenarios in which an M-ATV is transported 
back to CONUS.  
1.   M-ATV Base Case Model Layout   
We used a single vehicle to demonstrate the function of the cost model.  Other 
equipment types can be used to construct similar cost analyses.  The inputs we utilized 
are from a single M-ATV for the three base case models (i.e., transportation cost model, 
transfer cost model, and scrap cost model), consisting of a TAMCN, national stock 
number (NSN), dimentional data (length, width, and height), weight, original 
procurement cost, and service life.  The cost model determine 100 percent of the cost for 
each scenario of the base case.   
2. Transportation Cost Model 
The FBCR4 & AoA strategic model flow chart is constructed in order to 
understand the cost of R4 and potential alternatives.  The strategic model exhibits the 
sum of transportation costs and starts with the input of one M-ATV and continues until 
the vehicle reaches the home installation, as seen in Appendix H.  Multiple retrograde 
scenarios can be utilized depending on the sequence and chosen modes of transportation, 
as well as diffferent options for commercial carriers that provide services by means of the 
USC-06.   
The cost estimation for the OCONUS theater activities labor is, on average, 
approximately $2,336.48 in FY12 dollars per M-ATV, which is larger than that of 
materiel cost due to insufficient data.  When the data such as wash rack construction 
materiel, purged fuel, gallons of water, and other supplies becomes available, the correct 
costs can be inserted, as seen in Appendix H.  The assumptions used for the total number 
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individuals involved in OCONUS theater activities for the retrograde of one vehicle are 
broken down and further illustrated in Table 1. 
Table 1.   OCONUS Theater Activity Labor Cost Estimates 
 





$ / Person (Hr) 
 Min   Ave    Max 
               Total Cost                                  
  Min         Ave         Max 
(1) Supervisor (Military) 1 1 $19     $25 $31 ($19)  ($25) ($31) 
(2) Washer (Military) 3 6 $17     $18 $19 ($300)  ($321) ($342) 
(3) Driver (Military) 2 1 $17     $19 $23 ($33)  ($39) ($45) 
(4) Mechanic (Military) 1 1 $17     $19 $23 ($17)  ($19) ($23) 
(5) Dispatch (Military) 1 1 $17     $19 $23 ($17)   ($19) ($23) 
(6) R4 Ops (Contractor)  4 4 $62     $70 $78 ($959) ($1,114) ($1,243) 
LTI – Labor    
(1) Supervisor (Military) 1 1 $19     $25 $31 ($19)  ($25) ($31) 
(2) Inspector (Military) 2 2 $17     $19 $23 ($67)  ($78) ($90) 
(3) Supervisor (Military) 1 1 $62     $70 $78 ($62)  ($70) ($78) 
(4) Inspector (Military) 2 2 $62   $70 $78 ($246) ($279) ($311) 
Agriculture Inspection - 
Labor 
   
(1) Supervisor 
(Contractor) 
1 1 $62  $70 $78 ($62)  ($70) ($78) 
(2) Inspector (Contractor) 2 2 $62 $70 $78 ($246) ($279) ($311) 
 
The labor cost per hour calculations for military members reference the labor cost 
estimates in Appendix F.  Furthermore, the labor cost per hour for contractors were 
utilized from the average cost estimates of contractors involved with R4 operations at 
MCLC (Fwd) in Afghanistan during 2012.  These contractor costs were provided by BIC 
and can be seen in Table 2.  The labor estimate is based on the average labor for 22 and 
26 different contractors working on R4 operations at FOB Dwyer and Camp Leatherneck, 
respectively, and includes other costs such as the labor burden, fringe benefits, general 








































hours a day 
FOB Dwyer $104,424 $137,770 $242,194 $24,219 $932 $78 
Camp 
Leatherneck 
$65,519 $127,107 $192,626 $19,263 $741 $62 
Ave $84,972 $132,438 $217,410 $21,741 $837 $70 
 
The next step of this model begins with deciding what the first mode of 
transportation will be for the vehicles departing the theater of operation.  For retrograde 
scenarios dictating air transportation as the first mode, calculating costs start at the aerial 
port of embarkation (APOE) and conclude at the APOD.  The labor costs for air 
transportation consist of two categories: flight crew and ground crew.  The assumption of 
the breakdown for individuals involved with this phase is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3.   Air Transportation Labor Cost Estimations 
Flight Crew – Labor Personnel / Unit Ave Hrs / Flight   Min            Ave           Max 
(1) Pilot  2 7.91 ($596)   ($667) ($737) 
(2) Flight Engineer 1 7.91 ($211)  ($244) ($277) 
(3) Crew Chief 1 7.91 ($211)  ($229) ($246) 
(4) Load Master 1 7.91 ($182)  ($229) ($277) 
Ground Crew – Labor    
(1) Embarker 2 2 ($90)  ($107) ($124) 
(2) Refueler 1 1 ($19)  ($25) ($31) 
(3) Maintainer 4 15.82 ($1,203)  ($1,447) ($1,691) 
 
A breakdown of (C-17) aircraft rates is in this section of the model, and the model 
assumes that three M-ATVs will load onto a C-17 (as illustrated in Appendix I).  This 
breakdown identifies the flying cost per hour for total government costs (TGC), as seen 




The total flight cost estimate used for the analysis was the overall route average 
($56,915), a more conservative approach, as opposed to the three most likely APODs (see 
Table 4).    
Table 4.   Cost Per C-17 Flight Hour Estimates 
 
 








TGC per Flt Hr ($21,586)  
x 
# Hrs / (3) M-ATV 
                   APOD 1 ** 2.8 5.6 ($40,294) 
                   APOD 2 2.26 4.52 ($32,523) 
                   APOD 3 ** 6.2 12.4 ($89,222) 
                   APOD 4 4.8 9.6 ($69,075) 
                   APOD 5 ** 3.28 6.56 ($47,201) 
                   APOD 6 2.9 5.8 ($41,733) 
                   APOD 7 3.7 7.4 ($53,245) 
                   APOD 8 5.7 11.4 ($82,027) 
                   Ave 3.96 7.91 ($56,915) 
** Ave of 3 most likely 
utilized APODs 
4.09 8.19 ($58,906) 
 
The next possible mode of transportation is sealift.  When doing calculations for 
sea cost, we use measurement tons (M/T), which in the case of one M-ATV is 42 M/Ts.  
The costs begin to incur once the vehicle is delivered from the drayage service via the 
APOD or from the ground transportation network, such as the NDN routes or 
PAKGLOC.  The factors for this model consist of (1) the distance traveled from sea port 
of embarkation (SPOE) to the SPOD; (2) the vessel fee; and (3) the port fees.  The factors 















     Min             Ave           Max 




$8 $23 $30 M/T x Rate ($336)  ($966) ($1,260)  
Liner-Out 
Handling 
$8 $23 $30 M/T x Rate ($480)  ($1,380) ($1,260)  
Washing $110 $399 $770 Per Vehicle ($110)  ($399) ($770)  
Port Arbitrary  $17 $54 $95 M/T x Rate ($1,020)  ($3,240) ($5,700)  
Daily ITV $8 $10 $12 Per Vehicle ($8) ($10) ($12) 
Port Handling 
Cargo 
$10 $18 $34 M/T x Rate ($420)  ($756) ($1,428)  
 
All sea shipping fees are referenced from the current USC-06 rates and include the cost 
of labor and materiel in the general contract.   
The calculations for ground transportation in this model are available.  
Nevertheless, the current utilization of ground transportation for R4 is minimal due to the 
unauthorized passage of combat vehicles or lethal cargo sent through the NDN or 
PAKGLOC.  The model distinguished two major categories: the distance traveled and the 
ground transportation route fees (in accordance with the current USC-06).  The ground 
transportation route fees can be seen in Table 6; they estimate movement from either 
Camp Bastion or FOB Dwyer in Afghanistan to the port of Karachi or the NDN route.  
As part of the model, we calculated a high, average, and low estimate due to the variety 
















   Min             Ave          Max 
Flatbed 
(PAKGLOC) 
$8,338 $9,135 $18,183 Per 
Vehicle 
($8,338)  ($9,135) ($18,183)  
Flatbed (NDN) $10,868 $29,724 $64,095 Per 
Vehicle 
($10,868)  ($29,724) ($64,095)  
Tarping $10 $22 $25 M/T x 
Rate 
($420)  ($924) ($1,050)  
Crating $25 $57 $75 M/T x 
Rate 
($1,050)  ($2,394) ($3,150)  
Enhanced ITV $450 $746 $1,350 Per 
Vehicle 
($450)  ($746) ($1,350)  
Enhanced Physical 
Security  
$798 $1,062 $1,500 Per 
Vehicle 
($798)  ($1,062) ($1,500)  
Port Arbitrary $17 $54 $95 M/T x 
Rate 
($1,020)  ($3,240) ($5,700)  
Outer Routing 
KKT 
$2,375 $6,821 $8,550 Per 
Vehicle 
($2,375)  ($6,821) ($8,550)  
Outer Routing 
Chapman 
$3,750 $4,468 $4,950 Per 
Vehicle 
($3,750)  ($4,468) ($4,950)  
 
The rail network is available through the NDN, but it is not part of the model because the 
possibility of shipping heavy vehicles on freight railways is unlikely due to the lethal 
cargo limitations for each country.  The sea, air, and/or ground transportation can be 
combined or used in various retrograde situations to determine the total R4 cost.   
The calculations for CONUS activity costs include all labor and materiel once the 
equipment arrives at the SPOD, as seen in Table 7 and further explained in Appendix H.   
In addition, depreciation cost is applied by factoring in the service life of 16 years 
with the conservative assumption that the M-ATV has aged two years, which equates to 





Table 7.   CONUS Activity Estimates 
Transportation – 








($ per mile) 
Min       Ave         Max 
Total Cost 
 
    Min                 Ave              Max 
(1) SPOD to Depot 75% 286 $4.04 $8.20 $11.11 ($865) ($1,757) ($2,380) 
(2) Depot to Home 
Station 
75% 273 $4.04 $8.20 $11.11 ($826) ($1,678) ($2,273) 
Or         
(3) Straight to 
Home Station from 
SPOD 
25% 333 $3.89 $7.56 $10.22 ($324) ($630) ($851) 
 








Depot Reset Cost Factor 
 
Min        Ave         Max 
Total Cost 
 
      Min                Ave                 Max 
 75% $650K 0.4  0.525   0.65 ($195,000) ($255,938) ($316,875) 
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The output of the total costs for FBCR4 is displayed in Figure 17.  The analysis 
displayed shows a larger percentage of the costs in all CONUS activities that include 
transportation and repairs. 
 
Figure 17.  FBCR4 Total Cost Estimate Breakout per M-ATV 
The depreciation cost for each M-ATV is highly variable depending on each 
vehicle’s actual service life.  Table 8 illustrates scenarios in which the models assumption 
of a two-year average service life for each M-ATV is changed in calculating the total 
FBCR4 cost.  As displayed, an average 6 percent increase in total FBCR4 cost per year 
will occur as vehicles are identified with the accurate service life. 
Table 8.   Depreciation Cost per M-ATV 







      Min               Ave                 Max 
% of Procurement 
Cost 
Min       Ave       Max 
2 years ($81,250) ($319,668) ($411,017) ($509,075) 49% 63% 78% 
3 years ($121,875)) ($360,293) ($451,642) ($549,700) 55% 69% 85% 
4 years ($161,500) ($400,918) ($492,267) ($590,325) 62% 76% 91% 
5 years ($203,125) ($441,543) ($532,892) ($630,950) 68% 82% 97% 





























FBCR4 Total Cost Breakout / Unit  
(Low, Ave, High) 
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B.  ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES COST ESTIMATIONS 
The following analysis shifts focus to the AoA cost estimations.  We do this by 
laying out the transfer and scrap costs and comparing the results with FBCR4. 
1.  Transfer Cost Model 
The transfer portion illustrates required costs and it further considers associated 
revenue by selling the vehicle to allies via the FMS process.  The FBCR4 & AoA model 
assumes that OCONUS theater activities, as seen in Appendix H, will still take place 
regardless of the decision made to transfer the vehicle. 
When calculating the OCONUS labor activities for the transfer model, the 
activities are consistent with OCONUS labor in the transportation cost model.  The only 
difference is there is no requirement for an agriculture inspection laborer, which is 
$349 less labor on average (see Table 1).   
In calculating OCONUS materiel, the model also assumes that transportation cost 
for transferring is incurred by the receiving nation.  Additionally, the model generates an 
average unit price for vehicles transferred from historical EDA data (1993 to 2011); the 
average unit price for EDA grants and EDA sales are 16.08 and 4.43 percent, 
respectively.  The historical percentage is utilized to calculate possible cost savings by 
using a minimum, average, and high of 5, 20, and 50 percent, respectively.  The revenue 
potential at a 20 percent transfer price for each M-ATV is approximately $128K as 









Table 9.   Revenue Potential Estimates for EDA Transference 
 % of Acquisition Cost $ / Unit 
(1) Full Price from stock 100% $650,000 
(2) Price from Federal Condition Codes   
    (a) A-1 50% $325,000 
    (b) A-4 40% $260,000 
    (c) A-2, A-5, B-1, C-1, D-1, B-4, C-4 ,D-4 30% $195,000 
    (d) B-2, C2, D-2, B-5, C-5, D-5, D-7, E-7, F-7, G-7 20% $130,000 
    (e) A-3, B-3,C-3,D-3,A-6,B-6,C-6,H-7,F-8 10% $65,000 
    (f) D-8,H-8,D-9,H-9,F-9,F-X,G-X,H-X 5% $32,500 
                                                                                 Min                              Ave                           Max 
Total Materiel / Unit: $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Total Labor / Unit ($1,764.72) ($1,988) ($2,216) 
Total Cost / Unit ($1,764.72) ($1,988) ($2,216) 
Revenue / Unit $32,500.00 $130,000 $325,000 
Net Cost / Unit $30,735.28 $128,012 $322,784 
 
2. Disposal Cost Model 
The disposal cost model constructs cost estimates of the labor and materiel that 
are required to scrap one M-ATV and sell it to the local scrap market.  The model 
assumes that the similar initial OCONUS theater activities needed in the prior two 
models will be required for the disposal cost model.  The additional labor cost estimates 
can be seen in Table 10. 
Table 10.   Scrapping Labor Cost Estimations 




$ / Person (Hr) 
 Min   Ave    Max 
Total Cost 
  Min          Ave        Max 
(1) Demil 
Coordinator 
2 6.25 $61    $70 $78 ($770)   ($870) ($971) 
(2) Cutters 3 8.5 $61 $70 $78 ($1,571) ($1,776) ($1,980) 
(3) Laborers 3 8.5 $61  $70 $78 ($1,571)  ($1,776) ($1,980) 
(4) Forklift 
Operator 
1 8.5 $61  $70 $78 ($524)  ($592) ($660) 
(5) Contracting 
Officer 
1 8.5 $61  $70 $78 ($524) ($592) ($660) 




We applied a 75 percent usable weight factor for the average revenue potential 
with the assumption that not 100 percent of the vehicle will be reutilized and saleable as 
scrap materiel (i.e., tires, engine parts, seating, etc.) and then we further multiplied the 
given weight of each vehicle.  The scrap materiel cost is currently inchoate and requires 
further refinement from DLA and real-time data from in country disposition sites.  
Nevertheless, even though a small revenue can be made, the net cost results in zero 
savings due to a low dollar/pound of scrap sales ($0.0453), as seen in Table 11. 
Table 11.   Revenue Potential for Scrapping an M-ATV 
Scrap Revenue Potential w/ Labor & Materiel Costs 
(1) Unit Weight (lbs)  24,500  
(2) Useable Weight Factor (%) 50% 75% 100% 
(3) Useable Weight (lbs) 12,250 18,375 24,500 
(4) $ / lb $0.045 $0.045 $0.045 
(5) Revenue $555 $832 $1,110 
                                                           Min                 Ave               Max 
Total Materiel / Unit: $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Total Labor / Unit ($6,724) ($8,042) ($8,468) 
Total Cost / Unit ($6,724) ($8,042) ($8,468) 
Revenue / Unit ($555) ($832) ($1,110) 
Net Cost / Unit ($6,169) ($7,209) ($7,358) 
 
3.  What If Analysis 
 In Figure 18, we look at analyses for two additional TAMCNs: DD0025, an 
MRAP vehicle, and D0033, an up-armored HMMWV.  On average, the MRAP vehicle 
will have a FBCR4 of approximately $22,000 greater than that of the M-ATV.  No dollar 
value is gained when selling the scrap metal to local scrap vendors; nevertheless, the two 





Figure 18.  Ground Combat Vehicle Cost Savings Comparison  
for FBCR4 & AoA 
 The cost data for FBCR4 & AoA for the three different TAMCNs illustrates a 
considerably lower amount of revenue for the D0033, HMMWV; however, conservative 
cost estimates in all three options (transport, EDA, scrap) are similar when looking at the 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.   CONCLUSION 
The war on terrorism in Afghanistan has unfolded a prodigious effort by support 
personnel.  They are tasked with sustaining supplies, logistics, and firepower for allied 
forces in a landlocked country surrounded by geopolitically unstable neighbors one 
thousand miles from the nearest port—all during concurrent combat operations.   The 
same effort will be required to leave.  The intricacies of the conflict in Afghanistan 
illustrate the critical importance of in-depth logistics capabilities, strategic partnering to 
secure lines of communication, and having an array of supportable and flexible 
retrograde solutions. 
The FBCR4 & AoA model provides quantitative analysis and a strategic insight 
of the cost totality associated with military vehicular equipment returning from a combat 
theater, and it presents operational and logistics planners with alternative solutions for the 
disposition of that materiel.   
The primary objective of this thesis is to aggregate the numerous variables, fees, 
and constraints of R4 for any combat theater in order to contemporaneously assist in 
executing the Commandant’s OEF Ground Equipment Reset Strategy (USMC, 2012) and 
informing key leadership of critical R4 cost analysis.  This objective is accomplished 
through illustrating historical trends from past conflicts and evaluating a broad range of 
data.  Although our model is limited in precision, it captures and stitches together dozens 
of inputs, variables, and references associated with the current R4 processes of OIF and 
OEF, and it provides general illumination to total costs.  As a secondary objective, we see 
the FBCR4 & AoA model as the framework for a permanent planning tool not only for 
today’s complex logistical issues, but also for solving retrograde dilemmas in future 
conflicts. 
During the thesis research and analysis, we identified major cost drivers in the 
model as contract labor, required airlift as the first mode of transportation, and the 
significant percentage of depot-level maintenance for TAMCN items.  Contract support, 
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though important, is double or triple the cost of similarly skilled military personnel.  
Secondly, air transportation from the point of origin to the nearest seaport costs the 
government $21,000 to $37,000 per hour just to operate a C-17 or C-5.  Due to political 
constraints and road limitations out of Afghanistan, the so-called “air bridge” is critical 
for R4 and extricating equipment, but airlift is also the most costly mode of transport.  
When considering heavy equipment, limited aircraft capacities result in moving very few 
vehicles at a high cost, unlike sealift economies of scale in which ocean liner fees spread 
over hundreds of vehicles carried on one vessel.  On average, eight hours of air transport 
for one M-ATV is five times higher than sealift from the Persian Gulf region to CONUS.  
Lastly, after years of sustained combat and usage, it will take many years of maintenance 
to reset and refurbish equipment.  The forecasted percentage of TAMCN quantities 
requiring depot-level maintenance and the severity of maintenance percentage are the 
major factors in determining costs.  In our model, the maintenance percentage to return 
an M-ATV to its original condition is as high as 65 percent of the acquisition cost (or 
$422,500), and it is predicted by HQMC, I&L, LX that 75 percent of the M-ATV fleet 
will require depot-level repairs.  This might rival some insurance companies’ standard 
definitions of total loss and acceptable repairs when adding in all the costs of 
transportation prior to acceptance at maintenance facilities.   
In evaluating Cost Path 2 and the two alternatives to R4/transporting, our model 
provides insight into the process costs of excess defense articles (EDA) and disposing of 
items through scrapping.  Both alternatives show the same initial labor requirements as 
transporting, but continue in itemizing other materiel and labor costs and presenting 
potential revenue.  Scrapping requires substantially more man-hours in labor to 
completely reduce large items such as an MRAP or M-ATV to scrap metal, and the 
revenues are minimal and only offset costs by a small percentage.  Scrapping on a large 
scale is probably infeasible and not recommended because it would likely challenge the 
logistics system in materiel and personnel, consume more time than it warrants, and 
inefficiently return investment dollars.  Conversely, EDAs present the lowest costs and 
highest revenue if the sales of certain items are authorized, sensitive components are 
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simultaneously stripped, and acceptable buyers are found and willing to accept the 
equipment’s current condition and associated transaction costs.   
Although these alternatives might not be acceptable in full, they do offer options 
for commanders and planners to decrease surplus inventories at determined percentages 
without incurring the high costs of transportation, maintenance, and long-term support.  
There are numerous historical examples as presented in which these alternatives were 
applied.  Additionally, EDA and scrapping are viable options to consider, as uncertainty 
surrounds the MRAP, M-ATV, and older generation HMMWVs in regard to Service and 
mission integration, maintenance support, and future strategic and tactical requirements. 
Our research and model also illustrate a demand for obligatory coordination 
across multiple agencies to ensure success in the immediate actions necessary for an OEF 
drawdown and also in the long-term inventory, maintenance, and acquisition strategies of 
DoD Services.  Organizations instrumental in the FBCR4 & AoA are the component 
headquarters, DLA, DSCA, the State Department, and U.S. Transportation Command.  
Again, we reiterate the FBCR4 & AoA model as a foundational tool for R4 
analysis, and with refinement we hope that it will become a fundamental tool for the DoD 
in future planning and contingency operations.   
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Provided below are bulleted lists of our final recommendations to the DoD and 
suggested research areas in order to assist with improving the R4 process and related 
issues. 
• Adopt the FBCR4 & AoA model in making equipment disposition 
decisions for the OEF drawdown. 
• Institutionalize the FBCR4 & AoA model by establishing a Joint 
Equipment Disposition Strategy (JEDS) board to support the drawdown of 
OEF and future conflicts.  This board should include representatives from 
the Joint Staff, Military Services, USTRANSCOM, DLA, and DSCA to 
make fully burdened cost informed decisions on major equipment 
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disposition.  The JEDS board could be modeled after the Army’s 
Equipment Distribution Review Board (EDRB).  
• Develop a FBCR4 & AoA Joint Staff planning publication. 
• Consider the EDA sales option for combat vehicles whose total R4 costs 
exceed 50-65 percent of their original procurement costs. 
• Redirect R4 dollars saved by executing EDA sales of tactical wheeled 
vehicles to the JLTV or other programs. This will have the added benefit 
of contributing to sustaining the U.S. industrial base for tactical wheeled 
vehicles.  
• Realign equipment authorized acquisition objectives (AAO) with current 
and forthcoming strategic, military, and service strategies, missions, and 
requirements. 
• Reevaluate labor contracts and requirements for all activities to decrease 
costs. 
• Thoroughly analyze the major cost drivers in the OEF R4 process to 
determine more accurate costs, forecasts, and potential savings.  Run 
simulations and sensitivity analysis on the updated data. 
• Evaluate (using Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, 
Personnel, and Facilities) the support requirements for excess equipment 
returning from OIF and OEF, specifically the mission suitability, AAO 
quantities, and long-term maintenance requirements for the MRAP 
vehicles, M-ATVs, and HMMWVs. 
C.   SUGGESTED FURTHER RESEARCH 
• Improve the FBCR4 & AoA model by analyzing variables through 
optimization studies and Monte Carlo simulations. 
• Refine all labor costs and data in the model. 
• Analyze the “transactional cost economics” in the FBCR4 & AoA model. 
• Build into the model time constraints, capacities, and inventory costs. 
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• Conduct regression analysis to quantify the significant cost variables. 
• Build an accurate R4 timeline for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from 
Afghanistan based off this research and other cumulative information. 
• Build a metric or model that assists commanders in future conflicts by 
determining the time and logistics effort for retrograding forces from a 
given geographical point, even in offensive operations.  This could act as a 
strategic situational planning tool.   
• Determine if the JLTV program negates keeping, maintaining, and storing 

































APPENDIX A. SUPPLY CONDITION CODES 
 













APPENDIX B. DISPOSAL CONDITION CODES 
 




(ODUSD[L], 1997, p. 3.4-2) 
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APPENDIX C. FEDERAL CONDITION CODES 
 
  
(ODUSD[L], 1997, p. 7-22)  
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APPENDIX D. EDA TRANSFER PROCESS 
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APPENDIX F. MILITARY DEPLOYED PAY CHART 
Note. We created this table using information about combat pay and entitlements from 
the following websites: (www.militarypay.com) and (www.comptroller.defense.gov).   









Total Ave Hourly 
Combat Pay 
O-10  $295,240   $24,603   $      680   $25,283   $    972   $         81  
O-9  $298,409   $24,867   $      680   $25,547   $    983   $         82  
O-8  $275,574   $22,965   $      680   $23,645   $    909   $         76  
O-7  $245,980   $20,498   $      680   $21,178   $    815   $         68  
O-6  $232,064   $19,339   $      680   $20,019   $    770   $         64  
O-5  $193,920   $16,160   $      680   $16,840   $    648   $         54  
O-4  $166,273   $13,856   $      680   $14,536   $    559   $         47  
O-3  $132,959   $11,080   $      680   $11,760   $    452   $         38  
O-2  $106,997   $  8,916   $      680   $  9,596   $    369   $         31  
O-1  $  85,616   $  7,135   $      680   $  7,815   $    301   $         25  
WO-5  $191,550   $15,963   $      680   $16,643   $    640   $         53  
WO-4  $162,748   $13,562   $      680   $14,242   $    548   $         46  
WO-3  $139,175   $11,598   $      680   $12,278   $    472   $         39  
WO-2  $117,717   $  9,810   $      680   $10,490   $    403   $         34  
WO-1  $103,267   $  8,606   $      680   $  9,286   $    357   $         30  
E-9  $148,501   $12,375   $      680   $13,055   $    502   $         42  
E-8  $122,739   $10,228   $      680   $10,908   $    420   $         35  
E-7  $108,292   $  9,024   $      680   $  9,704   $    373   $         31  
E-6  $  91,901   $  7,658   $      680   $  8,338   $    321   $         27  
E-5  $  76,381   $  6,365   $      680   $  7,045   $    271   $         23  
E-4  $  62,996   $  5,250   $      680   $  5,930   $    228   $         19  
E-3  $  54,193   $  4,516   $      680   $  5,196   $    200   $         17  
E-2  $  49,812   $  4,151   $      680   $  4,831   $    186   $         15  
E-1  $  45,041   $  3,753   $      680   $  4,433   $    171   $         14  
       Pay explanations  Cost   Reference  
Annual/Monthly Military Composite Standard Rates  In Chart  Defense Comptroller 
Hostile Fire & Imminent Danger Pay (HF&IDP)   $    225  2011 Military Pay Chart 
Hardship Duty Pay (HDP)  $    100  2011 Military Pay Chart 
Deployed Per Diem (DPD)  $    105  2011 Military Pay Chart 
Family Separation Allowance (FSA)  $    250  2011 Military Pay Chart 
Aviation Career Incentive Pay not factored (Ave Difference is $1 more an hour) 
       
Formulas 
Combat Pay = Sum of (HF&IDP + HDP + DPD + FSA) 
Total Ave Monthly Combat Pay = Combat Pay + Monthly Military Composite Standard Rate 
       Assumptions 
1. Rates are daily based on 26 working days in a month (1 off day a week). 
2. Rates are hourly based on 12 hour work days. 
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APPENDIX G. KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
1.  Approved Acquisition Objective.  DoD 4140.1-R (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness [ODUSD(L&MR)], 2003), 
also referred to as the DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation, defines an 
approved acquisition objective (AAO) as being, “the quantity of an item authorized for 
peacetime and wartime requirements to equip and sustain U.S. and Allied Forces, 
according to current DoD policies and plans” (p. 55).  The Marine Corps Order 4490.1 
follows the same definition; however, it delineates an actual equation in which it sums all 
the USMC-specific materiel requirements in which Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command maintains responsibility (USMC, 1997, p. 3). 
2.  Condition Code.  The simplest definition of a condition code is that it is an 
alphanumeric code “which most accurately describes the materiel’s physical condition” 
(ODUSD[L], 1997, p. xxii).  Condition codes are used for supply accounting purposes 
and in “reutilization program screening and review” (ODUSD[L], 1997, p. xxii).  Further 
explanation is provided in Chapter II, Section A.4.   
3.  Disposal.  Disposal is “the process of reutilizing, transferring, donating, 
selling, destroying, or other ultimate disposition of personal property” (ODUSD[L], 
1997, p. xix).  The concept of disposal is similar to reutilizing, which has a main goal of 
“maximiz[ing] reutilization of DoD property” (CJCS, 2010b, p. 108).   
4.  Disposition.  Merriam-Webster defines disposition as “the act or the power of 
disposing or the state of being disposed” or also the “final arrangement” of an item 
(“Disposition,” 2012).  Disposition and disposal are sometimes interchangeable and it 
should not be assumed that an item is automatically destroyed when either term is 
utilized.  The DLA Disposition Services handles the disposal of equipment and materiel 
through the multiple means listed under disposal (2012). 
5.  Excess Defense Articles.  The term excess defense articles (EDA) is defined 
in law, Section 644 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), as follows: 
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The quantity of defense articles owned by the USG, and not procured in 
anticipation of military assistance or sales requirements, or pursuant to a 
military assistance or sales order, which is in excess of the Approved 
Force  Acquisition Objective and Approved Force Retention Stock of all 
DoD Components at the time such articles are dropped from inventory by 
the supplying agency for delivery to countries or international 
organizations under this Act. (FAA, 1961)   
Each Service defines what is in excess, and these items are provided “as is, where 
is,” at no cost to the customer, with the exception of transportation costs.  In the case of 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the foreign state does not pay transportation cost since the 
equipment is in place.  Two categories of EDA are sales EDA and grant EDA.  The 
difference is with sales EDA, funds are exchanged with an eligible country, whereas with 
grant EDA, items are “free” with the exception of packaging, crating, handling, and 
transportation.  
6.  Foreign Excess Personal Property.  An expression with a meaning similar to 
EDA, the term foreign excess personal property is defined in DoD 4160.21-M 
(ODUSD[L], 1997) as follows: 
FEPP may be transferred by the Secretary of Defense to foreign countries 
for foreign currencies or credits, substantial benefits, or the discharge of 
claims resulting from the compromise or settlement of such claims, in 
accordance with the law, when the Secretary of Defense determines that 
the transfer is in the interests of the United States (p. 9-4). 
However, the differentiation between EDA and FEPP is FEPP’s equipment 
maintains eligibility associated with non-standard equipment, as authorized by 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2321j. 
7.  Foreign Military Sales.  As defined by the SAMM, Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) is the organization within the DSCA that “provides for the sale of defense articles 
and/or defense services usually from DoD stocks or through purchase under DoD-
managed contracts” (DSCA, 2003, p. 95).    
8.  Measurement Ton.  As defined by the Universal Service Contract-06, a 
measurement ton (M/T) is “40 cubic feet per ton or 2240 lbs. per ton” (USTRANSCOM, 
2011, p. 51).  All sea transportation costs require M/T as a metric to calculate the 
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shipping cost, while air shipping requires pounds (lbs.) to be used in cost determination.  
The traditional view of long ton and short ton have been used within the DoD as 2000 
lbs, and for the purpose of this thesis, we use only the M/T for cost estimates.  
9.  Recapitalization.  To recapitalize means to rebuild.  For the purpose of this 
report, we use the term in the same way as in JP 4-0: “Rebuild recapitalizes an item to a 
standard as nearly as possible to its original condition in appearance, performance, and 
life expectancy to include technology upgrades and capability improvements.  Rebuild is 
the highest degree of materiel maintenance applied to equipment” at the highest level of 
maintenance, which is the depot level in DoD components (CJCS, 2008, p. II 5).  
10.  Reconstitution.  In most literature, reconstitution is analogous to the term 
reset.  However, the Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 4-12, Operational-Level 
Logistics, describes reconstitution as “the regeneration, reorganization, replenishment, 
and reorientation of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) for a new mission 
without having to return to home base” (USMC, 2002, p. 12).  In the OEF Ground 
Equipment Reset Strategy, the Marine Corps differentiates reconstitution from reset by 
stating that reconstitution is defined “as actions beyond reset, taken during or after 
operational employment, to restore or upgrade combat capability to full-spectrum 
operational readiness, which includes personnel, equipment, and training” (USMC, 2012, 
p. 5). 
11.  Redeployment.  JP 1-02 (CJCS, 2010a) categorizes redeployment as “the 
transfer of forces and materiel to support another joint force commander’s operational 
requirements, or to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home and/or 
demobilization stations for reintegration and/or out-processing” (p. 261).  The Marine 
Corps definition is the movement of Class VII principal end items (PEIs) from the theater 
of operation to the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) units, which requires no reset.  In 
terms of this thesis, we use redeployment in terms of returning personnel and equipment 
to the home station, requiring no reset. 
12.  Reset.  The OIF Ground Equipment Reset Plan (USMC, 2009) defines the 
reset concept as “actions taken to restore units to a desired level of combat capability 
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commensurate with the unit’s future mission” (p. 5).  It further points out the equipment 
in this category is defined as “destroyed, damaged, stressed, rendered obsolete, or worn 
out beyond economic repair due to combat operations” (p. 5).  Funding requirements are 
placed in two appropriations: operation and maintenance (O&M) funds and procurement.  
In a 2010 Congressional Research Service report, the DoD requested $151 billion for the 
reset of equipment (Belasco, 2011, p. 50).   
13.  Retrograde.  JP 1-02 (CJCS, 2010a) categorizes retrograde as the “process 
for the movement of non-unit equipment and materiel from a forward location to a reset 
(replenishment, repair, or recapitalization) program or to another directed area of 
operations to replenish unit stocks, or to satisfy stock requirements” (p. 290).  Key 
considerations for the planning of retrograde operation according to JP 4-09, Distribution 
Operations (CJCS, 2010b), include the “type and amount of reparable components used, 
the maintenance concepts associated, and repair cycles, arrangements for cleaning, and 
USDA inspection prior to shipment from the theater” (p. 81).  It later emphasizes cost as 
being a result of any postponement of the considerations for planning.  The service 
definition is the movement of Class VII PEIs from the theater of operation to the Marine 
Corps Logistics Command (MCLC).  In terms of this thesis, we use retrograde to mean 
the act of returning equipment from the theater of operations.    
14.  Reutilization.  JP 4-09 (CJCS, 2010b) provides the following explanation of 
reutilization: “Reutilization of DoD excess is a source of supply for combatant forces, 
reduces the need for retrograde transportation, and minimizes the need for abandonment 
and destruction of FEPP” (p. 108). 
15.  Reverse Logistics.  Due to growing economic and environmental concerns, 
interest in reverse logistics has risen and has been carried out within the DoD by the 
DLA.  According to the Reverse Logistics Executive Council (2012), reverse logistics is 
“the process of planning, implementing, and controlling the efficient, cost effective flow 
of raw materiel, in-process inventory, finished goods and related information from the 




disposal.”  The reverse logistics pipeline has many benefits to the military, including 
“increased readiness and cost savings” (Diener, Peltz, Lackey, Blake, & Vaidyanathan, 
2005, p. 59). 
16.  R2.  R2 is the combination of the retrograde and redeployment processes.  
The R2 process map developed by HQMC, Installations and Logistics (I&L), Logistics 
Operations Analysis Division (LX) is an additional simulation tool for cost, time, and 
processes in Afghanistan. 
17.  R4.  R4 is a Marine Corps acronym that stands for retrograde/redeployment 
in support of reset/reconstitution and that has emphasized the complete cycle of 
movement of equipment in Afghanistan to the home theater. 
18.  Transference.  In this thesis, transference is used to describe the act of 
transferring and selling equipment to allies and/or reducing materiel to scrap metal, then 
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APPENDIX H. DETAILED VIEW AND EXPLANATION OF THE 
MODEL 
In this appendix, each section of the FBCR4 & AoA cost model and associated 
line items are presented in order to provide a closer look at the actual cost factors 
affecting the retrograde and reset of equipment.  These details are placed in an appendix 
in order to ensure all technical information is afforded to the reader without disrupting the 
flow of analysis in the main body.  
Starting with the big picture, Figure 19 shows the strategic view side-by-side with 
a macro-level snapshot of the spreadsheet model that is used to analyze the costs of 
FBCR4 & AoA for an individual TAMCN item.  It is immediately apparent that the 
spreadsheet model is nearly a mirror imagine of the strategic view, only it has dozens of 
inputs for each segment.  Of note, the spreadsheet model is only useful for deriving cost 
information for vehicular, rolling stock, or break-bulk type items that are not 
containerized, as mentioned in Chapter II, Section III, in regard to the two broad 
categories USTRANSCOM uses to analyze equipment classification. 
  
        
 
Figure 19.  The FBCR4 & AoA Model Strategic View (left) and Itemized 
Spreadsheet Cost Model (right) 
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In the following subsections we present and expand the details of the spreadsheet model. 
A. TABLE AUTHORIZED MATERIEL CONTROL NUMBERS DATA 
INPUT 
All information associated with an individual piece of equipment is plugged in to 
this segment of the model and represents Step 1 of calculating costs.  The inputs are the 
TAMCN number, NSN, original unit acquisition value, expected service life, total unit 
quantity, total unit acquisition value, dimensions, weight in M/T, and gross vehicle 
weight.  Figure 20 illustrates a partial view of the listed inputs that are in the model.  A 
majority of required vehicle TAMCN data is found in the Ground Equipment Reset 
Playbook (I&L, 2012), GEMS-MC data, and Principal Technical Characteristics of U.S. 





Figure 20.  Partial Expansion of the TAMCN Data Segment of the Itemized 
Spreadsheet Cost Model 
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B. POINT-OF-ORIGIN OPTIONS 
This segment of the model is synonymous with OCONUS theater actions & AoA 
and illustrates the three options of transport, EDA, and scrap at the point of origin, no 
matter the location.  As formerly presented in the conceptual and strategic viewpoints, 
materiel and labor requirements are broken down separately and factored in the 
spreadsheet model.  The first materiel and labor inputs are represented in light gray (seen 
in Figures 21–24) because they are required inputs across the board for all three options 
and their costs should not differ for either course of action.  Essentially, an item needs 
cleaning and a thorough inspection prior to transporting, selling, or scraping.  The actions 
in light gray are wash-rack materiel and labor and limited technical inspection (LTI) 
labor.  Labor is subcategorized by numerous job skills and further classified as a military 
specialty or contractor position.  The latter is important due to the significant contractor 
support in current military operations and disparity between military and contractor 
wages for like skills.  As an itemized cost model, flexibility is inherently built in for the 
planner’s environment or situation.  He or she can add or drop materiel and labor as 
required to realistically portray the processes on the ground.  
 For simplicity in the model, each line item has only one type of distribution built 
into its total cost.  The triangle distribution (minimum, average, and maximum) for cost is 
utilized for a majority of materiel and labor in the point-of-origin options (see Figure 21) 
and other segments.  However, different distributions across all variables, such as the line 
item’s unit quantity, labor hours per unit, and cost, could easily be incorporated in further 
research and more complex models. 
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Figure 21.  Point-of-Origin Segment of the Itemized Spreadsheet Cost Model 
showing Line Items and Cost Factors 
1. To Transport   
 Below the double line, the dark-gray portion illustrates actions, labor, or materiel 
associated with the point-of-origin option.  Of particular importance to transportation are 
an agriculture inspection (which is required by the USDA) and other necessary materiel, 
such as radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, packaging, and materiel handling 
equipment (MHE), as shown in Figure 22.  It is possible that the agriculture inspection is 
not sequenced at the point of origin and occurs later in the transportation process, but still 
prior to an item’s final embarkation on a ship or airline that directly enters the United 
States.  However, the agriculture inspection is listed as an upfront cost under “To 
Transport” because it is a known factor for this course of action. 
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Figure 22.  Point-of-Origin Segment for Transport of the  
Itemized Spreadsheet Cost Model 
2. To EDA 
As we previously mentioned, the EDA segment has the same materiel and labor 
costs (in light gray) as transporting and scrapping.  These variables and costs 
automatically populate in the model for EDA.  In addition to materiel and labor, there is a 
potential DSCA surcharge in handling the transaction(s) with a foreign buyer.  This 
charge is also known as the working capital fund overhead cost (Figure 23).   
EDA distinguishes itself from transportation in that there is resale and revenue 
potential on the original investment.  Revenue is subject to the current condition and 
value of an item after a LTI or physical assessment is conducted.  The Federal Condition 
Codes determine the percentage of original acquisition cost at which an item is valued, 
and these percentages range from 5 to 50 percent (see Appendix C).  If a command 
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directly transfers a piece of equipment new from inventory, then up to a 100 percent of 
the original acquisition cost is realized as revenue, and conversely, no revenue is gained 
if an item is granted through EDA.  This range of revenue potential is show in Figure 23.   
Additionally, no transportation costs are represented in the model for EDA 
because it is typical for the buyer to pay all costs associated with shipping after accepting 
the item, unless specific arrangements are made between parties.    
 
 




3. To Scrap 
Scrapping has the same initial materiel and labor costs as the other two options.  
These costs may seem counterintuitive, but they are necessary in order to ensure a vehicle 
or piece of equipment is properly cataloged and clear of debris to avoid interference with 
the actual scrapping process.  Scrapping has a working capital fund surcharge from DLA 
for the transfer and handling of equipment, similar to DSCA’s overhead cost.   
Specific to this segment are the numerous other required materiel, special 
equipment, and labor for implementing the scrapping processes, as seen in Figure 24.  




Figure 24.  Point-of-Origin Segment for Scrapping of the  
Itemized Spreadsheet Cost Model 
C. OCONUS MODES OF TRANSPORTATION 
This segment of the itemized spreadsheet cost model provides three detailed 
options or modes of transportation in lieu of a point-of-origin decision to transport 
equipment out of theater.  The three options of transport are categorized as air, land, or 
sea, and each table provides specific variables in materiel and labor that are required for 
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that mode of transportation.  This step in the process is repeated as many times as 
necessary for the exact number of legs (i.e., node-to-node) in the selected route from 
OCONUS to CONUS.   
1. To Transport via Air 
The first section of air transport represents the basic inputs of the particular 
aircraft that are standard for strategic airlift for the expected transportation routes.  The 
aircraft information includes air speed, crew size, and the number of TAMCN units a 
particular plane is capable of carrying.  Air speed is only necessary if an average flight 
time to an APOD is not provided.   
The following aircraft information includes current 2012 USTRANSCOM rates 
that represent the fixed and variable cost of utilizing an aircraft for contingency 
operations such as OIF or OEF.  There is also a blank line item for a commercial aircraft 
origination fee if utilizing this type of transport; however, we did not consider it due to its 
high variability and to the problems it caused in establishing a baseline cost in the model.  
For this thesis, the C-17 is the primary mover and only the total cost (fixed and variable) 
to the government is considered in order to derive FBCR4. 
Flight information comprises of the flying time between APOE and APOD, and 
then multiplies that time by two in order to derive a round-trip calculation.  Only the 
round-trip time is used because the USTRANSCOM “air-bridge” during a retrograde is 
two-way and continuous until the last piece of equipment is moved.  The cost to the 
government per flight is simply the USTRANSCOM rate per hour multiplied by the 
round trip in hours.  This section is also listed as materiel expenditure because fixed and 
variable costs are highly associated with the actual aircraft, fuel, and asset depreciation. 
Labor is similar to the previous point-of-origin segment, but broken down in to 
the flight and ground crews with space to add or drop job skills.  Flight crew labor is 
multiplied by the sum average of all round-trip times, and this number is more 
conservative than the sum average of the three most likely traveled APODs.  Ground 




Figure 25.  Air Mode of Transportation of the Itemized Spreadsheet Cost Model 
2. To Transport via Land 
The second mode of transportation in the model (Figure 26) is delivery of 
equipment over land.  This option predominantly involves the transfer of combat vehicles 
by flatbed trucks or rail through designated land routes and lines of communications.  
The land information includes fees for flatbed usage, tarping, crating, washing, enhanced 




Figure 26.  Land Mode of Transportation of the Itemized Spreadsheet Cost 
Model 
3. To Transport via Sea 
Moving equipment by ship is the third logical option for transporting equipment 
out of theater.  As in the air and land options, the first section contains pertinent 
information for the expected transportation routes.  However, materiel and labor are 
represented together in all of the subsequent sections because the general contract (USC-
06) reflects most actions or inputs as a service rate and not separately as materiel and 
labor.  The contract minimum, average, and maximum fees under activity costs are 
sourced and linked directly from USC-06 data. 
 The drayage fee is a cost for short-range transportation between an APOD and 
SPOE or vice versa, a SPOD and APOE.  Drayage is considered less than 10 miles in 
distance.   
 The next two sections show the associated inputs and potential costs for the usage 




Figure 27.  Sea Mode of Transportation of the Itemized Spreadsheet Cost Model 
D. CONUS ACTIONS AND FINAL DESTINATION 
This segment of the spreadsheet model includes the CONUS transportation and 
depot-level maintenance costs that are reflected in the conceptual and strategic views.  
Labor and materiel costs are combined again to accurately reflect the USC-06 contract 
fees.  There are only two options when returning to CONUS: (1) equipment goes directly 
to a home port or (2) the equipment is inducted at a depot facility.  The GEMS-MC data 
provides the model forecasted percentages of those two options for a certain TAMCN.  
Additionally, in order to simplify this segment and end analysis, a weighted percentage 
based off of the GEMS-MC data is factored in to both the transportation and depot costs. 
Using this calculation method ultimately presents an average cost per unit across the 
entire TAMCN instead of two separate totals for vehicles going to a home port or depot. 
Along with this weighted percentage, transportation factors the average miles to a 
home port or depot on both coasts and the average cost per mile from the USC-06 
contract. 
Depot costs multiply the weighted percentage, original acquisition value, and 
reset cost factor to derive the average cost per unit receiving this level of maintenance 
(Figure 28).  The reset cost factor is found in the OEF Ground Equipment Reset Strategy 




Figure 28.  CONUS Actions of the Itemized Spreadsheet Cost Model 
E. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS TABLES 
The final segment of the model is the summary of analysis that illustrates the cost 
result tables for each of the initial point-of-origin options—to transport, EDA, or scrap.  
By originally selecting to transport equipment out of theater, the resulting costs become 
the total for FBCR4.  In the FBCR4 summary, all OCONUS and CONUS activities are 
added to provide a per-unit grand total for the entire TAMCN, as well as minimum and 
maximum cost estimates.  The percentage of the vehicle’s original procurement cost is 
also provided to give a further quantitative perspective on transporting an item back to 
CONUS.   
The EDA and scrap cost result tables mirror each other in layout and both 
calculate a net value between materiel and labor costs and any realized revenue.  In 
addition, the percentage of the vehicle’s original procurement cost is provided for 
comparison among options.   
We describe and analyze any results in Chapter IV of this thesis.   
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APPENDIX I. AIR LOAD PLANS 
 
 
Figure 29.  C-17 Air Load Plan for M-ATV (From Integrated Computerized 
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